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Abstract 
 
An explanation of the nature of geography is the purpose of this paper. Geography was established 
as one of the scientific fields in ancient times, so that it has contained very much the character of a 
natural history. It was therefore exposed to frequent criticism from modern systematic sciences. In 
one respect, theories of modern geography always had a feature as an answer to them. The modern 
geographer refused the criticism that geography should be separated into subfields of systematic 
sciences. Thus, geography has held its tradition in the present scientific order. Its theories are, 
however, not perfect, and only maintain consistency as one field. Especially, it is enough to be 
afraid of its fragmentation that there had been seen the rise and fall of many schools in current 
geography. This paper attempts to explain the nature of geography in order to establish its 
perfection. 
 In Chapter II, we detect a common radical problem of geography, which is considered as an 
assemblage of various views. Therein, we focus on the argument between Schaefer and Hartshorne 
about the criticism of “exceptionalism.” This is one of the representative controversies over the 
basic theory of geography, and evaluated as the one of the philosophical origins of the “quantitative 
revolution” that divided itself from traditional geography such as Hartshorne’s view. Then, if there 
is a problem in common among both the old and new views of geography, it also should be 
regarded as a radical problem of geography. On such supposition, we analyzed the statements of 
both.    
 A summary of their views is as follows. Schaefer considered that all studies have to be connoted 
by the systematic sciences that consist of the physical and social sciences, and denied the 
conventional traditional geography that has and does not have characters of both the physical and 
social sciences. According to him, true geography is merely a subfield of the social sciences, which 
concerns a concept of space that consists of part of the “morphological law.” On the other hand, 
Hartshorne is representative of the traditional geography that denied the systematic sciences and its 
subcategories such as the physical and social sciences, so that geography is an independent field 
neither physical nor social and therefore not systematic. For him, the subject of geography is “space” 
or “region,” which distinguishes the consistent complex of the phenomena from others. 
 Thus, their views are obviously opposed to each other. However, we also understand that their 
concepts as the subject of geography, the “morphological law” and “space/region,” are outlines of 
the substances in common; their concepts of geography’s subject are consistent with each other. 
Thus, there has been only one concept of space as the basis of geography. 
 Then, we analyze this concept of space in philosophical terms. As a result, we find that it is similar 
to Aristotle’s concept of space; it is just like the “form” that encloses the “material.” However, 
matter is enclosed by space according to Aristotle. In contrast, geographical space encloses some of 
the phenomena. This space, which conforms to theories of either Ancient Greece or the modern 
West, has a logical difficulty when it comes to the unity of itself as a concept. Therefore, it is 
considered as a radical problem of geography. Accordingly, we introduce Zhu-zi’s concept of space, 
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which was born in Eastern philosophy. 
 In Chapter III, we introduce this Eastern concept of space. Zhu-zi xue (朱子學) is representative 
of the school of Confucianism by Zhu-xi (朱熹) called “Neo-Confucianism” due to its difference 
from previous ideas in the Western world. In Zhu-zi Xue, the concept of space has a multilayered 
definition. First, the concepts of “Tian-Wen” (天文) as infinite space-time and “Di-Li” (地理) as 
finite space are provided. They explain the epistemological principle called “Yin-Yang” (陰陽), and 
are divided according to whether they can be recognized or not. The infinite space whose 
boundaries can be recognized and the infinite time whose circulation can be recognized are defined 
as “Tian-Wen.” The finite space whose boundaries can be recognized is defined as “Di-Li.”  
Next, these concepts of space and time have “Tian-Di (天地)” as their substance. “Tian-Di” is a 
monistic diffusion-condensation action based on the “Yin-Yang” theory and is the substance that is 
at the root of the universe. The total reality consists of not only “Tian-Di” but also “Ren” (人) as the 
action that gives order to everything. This “Ren,” which literally means the “man,” is based on the 
human principle of recognition. Nothing has any order without recognition by someone. After “Ren” 
as the recognition acted, “Tian-Di” begets order and harmony, and constructs the world by its 
diffusion-condensation action. In short, “Ren” is the logic. 
 Finally, there is the metaphysical-differential principle called “Yi-Yin-Yi-Yang” (一陰一陽) 
behind “Tian-Di” and “Ren.” It is the reason why the concrete world is what it is, so that it is a 
denial of the absolute One (such as “To hen”); it is the plurality. Because of this principle that 
nothing can be the absolute One, it is concluded that there must be substances of each space, time, 
and logic as the minimal features of construction of the real world. “Tian-Di,” “Ren,” “Tian-Wen,” 
and “Di-Li” are not only the entire world but also its minimal conditions.  
 In Chapter IV, we adopt “Di-Li,” the Neo-Confucian concept of space as the subject of geography, 
and show the process for solving the difficulty mentioned in Chapter II raised by “Di-Li.” This 
eastern concept of space does not have an outline like Aristotle‘s space; therefore, it is unnecessary 
to force ourselves to state that space is equal to the inner phenomena. “Di-Li” is a part of the entire 
world and is omnipresent as the framework of the world. If we define the subject of geography as 
“Di-Li,” there will be no difficulties in the traditional concept of space such as Hartshorne’s 
“space/region.” According to it, geography should not be classified under any of the systematic 
sciences but as an independent field. Geography has held the proper subject in actual since ancient 
times. Thus, this paper agrees and confirms that all of geographical studies fall under one discipline. 
 
Key words: Space, Neo-Confucianism, History of geography, Modern geography, Contemporary 
geography, Geographical philosophy 
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I. Introduction 
 Geography is one of the oldest sciences in the world. This science had already occupied 
its own field when many modern sciences were mixed in the name of philosophy. 
Therefore, it is antiquated, and has a different theoretical basis from the standpoint of 
the modern sciences. As a matter of fact, there is criticism that geography has been a 
matter of natural history, which is an old-fashioned description. In this context, 
geographers study from a theoretical basis. What is geography? Why was this field 
independent in the ancient era? We need to answer these questions if we believe 
geography is not subordinate to other fields. 
 Geographers often discuss the definition of their own field, and there is no field like 
geography in this respect. Varenius, Kant, Humboldt, Ritter, and others are publicly 
honored as the great founders of modern geography because they attempt to convert 
geography into a systematic science. Their studies are a kind of identity that requires 
geography as a descendant of ancient philosophy such as mathematics or astronomy. 
All of them stated that geography is a unique field, so it should not be divided in many 
fields as a mother of sciences like natural history. Thus, modern geography started 
with a sophisticated basic theory, but it faced a lot of difficulties ahead. There is no 
doubt that geography is old. If it conforms to modern scientific logic while holding its 
old character, we have to define it precisely. Therefore, the history of the discussion on 
the nature of geography concerns the history of geography itself, and various theories 
repeat the field’s rise and fall even now. For example, German geography has produced 
Humboldt, Ritter, Ratzel, Richthofen, and Hettner; French human geography is 
represented by Vidal de la Blache and Cholley; and American geography succeeds these 
traditions with Sauer and Hartshorne. Theorists from each country thoroughly 
investigated the concept of the subject of geographical studies. Moreover, quantitative 
geography, or the so-called “new geography,” was started by Schaefer and Bunge; 
humanistic geography was born out of Relph and Tuan’s criticisms; and more 
contemporary geographical schools also devoted themselves to this science. However, 
each of them has minute theoretical problems that may bring fragmentation upon 
themselves. Do these projects explain the nature of geography’s collapse? Is geography 
divided as a mother of modern sciences, or is it absorbed in social science as one of its 
subfields? 
 This paper attempts to answer the questions. Through their dazzling and chaotic 
volumes, the fruits of theoretical studies stored as a history of geography have a 
consistent concept; geographical theories always have a concept of space in their core 
even if they have antagonistic views on other points. It is inferred from how Kant 
characterized geography as “spatial science” to the field’s historical characterization as 
“temporal science” (Hartshorne 1958) to Ritter’s statement that “spaces on the surface 
of the earth are an initial subject of geography” (Ritter 1991: 77); he called this a 
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purpose of geography (Noma 1963: 97-98). The quantitativists criticized traditional 
theory such as Kant or Ritter as well as spatial relationships as a main concept of 
geography. After that, the humanistic geographers resisted the “quantitative 
revolution,” but they were also concerned with a kind of concept of space, for instance 
the “experience of space” (Tuan 1993), “placeness” (Relph 1991), and “spaciality” (Soja 
1989). Of course, these contain mutually incompatible elements. However, because 
they conclude that geography is a spatial science in spite of their antinomies, it shows 
the theoretical importance of the concept of space in this field.  
 In light of the present theories on geography’s basis, a concept of space that is not 
defined firmly even now has not carried out its function as a theoretical core. Perhaps it 
is supposed that a problem is hidden in the concept. If we explain the strange situation 
that geographers always trust the word “space” as the basis of the field as a science 
although many disagree regarding the term, we can also construct a basic theory that 
explains the nature of geography. 
 This paper first aims to clarify a radical problem in geography’s thoroughly 
well-known argument: the so-called criticism of “exceptionalism.” This criticism is an 
attack on Hartshorne by Schaefer (1953) and on the origin of the “quantitative 
revolution.” It divided contemporarily from modern geography. Therefore, it may be 
shown that there is a theoretical problem with respect to a contrast between the new 
and the old. 
 Second, in order to solve the problem, we introduce a new basic theory. Here, we focus 
on Zhu-zi Xue (朱子學), which represents Chinese thought as Neo-Confucianism, and 
was denied until now because it is not western philosophy. Zhu-zi Xue is related to 
modern and contemporary geography. According to the current studies, Zhu-zi Xue, or 
the Neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming era, influenced modern western philosophers, 
especially Leibniz (Horiike 1996: 2002). Leibniz’s thought was succeeded by Wolff and 
Kant, and the influence of Zhu-zi Xue on Laibniz was also adopted by them (Igawa 
2009; Schonfeld 2006). Geographers look up to Kant as the founder of modern 
geography, and consequently it is difficult to deny the existence of a theoretical 
relationship between geography and Zhu-zi Xue. There is, however, another reason 
why this paper focuses on this eastern, older thought. If Zhu-zi Xue was not related to 
modern geography, we supposed that the Zhu-zi Xue should be adopted as our basic 
theory because Zhu-zi Xue has an elegant concept of space that is suited to the 
explanation of the nature of geography. Although the relationship between this Chinese 
philosophy and western geography is profoundly interesting, it is not a pure subject of 
theoretical study. It is certain that Zhu-zi Xue is not western thought. However, if it 
has a logical and effective concept of space, we never need to ask its descent.           
The above is an outline of this paper. In order to achieve the paper’s purposes, we 
discuss the radical problem of geography; especially the argument between Schaefer 
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and Hartshorne in chapter II, and we introduce the concept of space in Zhu-zi Xue, 
which addresses the problem. Subsequently, in chapter IV, we explain the nature of 
geography on the basis of the results of a previous discussion. 
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II. A radical problem of geography  
 A series of discussions called a “quantitative revolution” are a prominent topic in the 
change of geography’s basic theory. This is not only an adoption of a new mathematical 
method, but also a movement that tries to shake off the old regional geographic basis 
by Hettner and Hartshorne. Takahashi et al. (1976: 427) said that “quantitative 
revolution” is “a question about the philosophy and methodology of geography 
essentially” that “advocated reorganization of geography as a science based on the 
adoption of a so-called scientific methodology.” In addition, it is Schaefer’s 
“Exceptionalism in geography: A methodological examination” (1953) that is part of the 
origin of the movement at its philosophic basis. “Exceptionalism” is an offensive name 
in Hartsborne’s view of geography, which rejects the “ideographic” methodology of a 
regional geography. This essay was not strongly considered at first, but later Bunge 
(1970) “discovered” it as part of the origin of the movement; it is appreciated as part of 
the theoretical basis of geography as a “spatial science” (Sugiura 1991: 303). 
Subsequently, the movement was researched briefly by Harvey (1979). 
 There were, however, criticisms regarding the theory of quantitative geography from 
the standpoint of behaviorism, humanism, Marxism, and so forth. It is like the 
confusion that Harvey, who perfected quantitativism, spearheads (Takeuchi 1980: 433). 
Now, there are schools that are succeeded by each principle in geography, so at a glance, 
“quantitative revolution” is merely a past event. However, this is not a reasonable 
understanding of the basic theory of geography. The movement is a division between 
the traditional basis and the new one. It will be discussed in detail later; the schools 
that emerged after the movement such as humanistic geography are also based on 
quantitative theory. Therefore, it is supposed that contemporary geography has two 
bases; one is the “ideographic” or holistic school of Hartshorne, and the other is the 
“systematic” or analytical school of Schaefer. 
 In order to accomplish the purpose of this paper by explaining geography, we have to 
reveal this problem regarding basic theory. Where does the problem emerge? It is, 
perhaps, expected that it will emerge from a kind of theoretical boundary, especially 
Schaefer’s criticism of “exceptionalism” in Hartshorne’s solid theory. We focus on both, 
and compare their characteristics to discover the radical problem of the basic theory of 
geography in this chapter.   
 
1. Formation of contemporary geography and Schaefer’s criticism of “exceptionalism” 
 
a. Schaefer’s geography 
 As stated above, “exceptionalism” is Schaefer’s criticism of Hartshorne’s traditional 
theory. Here, we shall show what the word “exceptionalism” means, or why it had been 
leading the “quantitative revolution” theoretically.  
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 According to Schaefer (1953: 231), “exceptionalism” is a group of ideas amounting to 
the notion that “geography is quite different from all other sciences, methodologically 
unique, as it were.” He doubted the independence of geography as a sort of “integral 
science.” This sort of traditional “geography” is merely a “division of labor” of other 
systematic fields (Schaefer 1953: 227) for him, hence considering it as its own field is 
unnecessary. There are, however, a group of ideas and methodologies that support it; 
geography has two main subfields in the form of the systematic and the regional, and 
its independence is established by the latter. Schaefer resisted this prominence of 
regional geography and rejected its theory as faulty: “Its procedure is in principle not 
different from that of any other social or natural science which searches for laws of, 
what amount to the same thing, has reached the systematic stage” (Schaefer 1953: 229). 
He compared it with representative theorists such as the founder of modern geography, 
and indicated a difference; “Hettner thought that the core of geography was regional. 
Hartshorne believes that systematic geography is really indispensable to regional work. 
…but the heart of geography is nevertheless regional….Neither Humboldt nor Ritter 
were plagued by these pseudo-issue. As they clearly saw, systematic geography attempt 
to formulate the rules and the laws which are applied in regional geography” (Schaefer 
1953: 230). Finally, he addressed the question of why this idea is recognized as 
important and declared, “One may conjecture that this notion is a hangover from the 
time when there were no social sciences and not much natural sciences, and when such 
quaint and encyclopedic endeavors natural history and cosmology still occupied their 
place” (Schaefer 1953: 231). He thought that traditional geography is antiqued natural 
history, which should be separated as a modern systematic science; despite this, 
because geographers refuse the systematic methodology, there are “exceptionalism” 
arguments like regional geography or “integral science.” 
 Schaefer also criticized Kant. He regarded Kant as “the father of exceptionalism” 
(Schaefer 1953: 232) who formed a kind of non-scientific geography, and said that 
“what Kant called geography Humboldt called more judiciously cosmology, at the same 
time emphasizing the scientific nature of geography proper” (Schaefer 1953: 235). 
Schaefer pointed out that this was Kant’s idea that was merely quoted from a 
transcript of a lecture, but his critique is as follows: “how unfortunate, then, that so 
many geographers kowtow to a patently immature idea of his youth” (Schaefer 1953: 
233). Thus, he denied authority to Kant, who is traditionally recognized as the founder 
of modern geography. 
 How did Schaefer himself, who attacked the mainstream at that time, think about 
geography? The following is a summary of his views. First, he thought it is unnecessary 
to classify or describe geography because of the development of the natural sciences. 
Science should not describe phenomena, but explain it. In addition, he said that “to 
explain the phenomena one has described means always to recognize them as instance 
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of law” (Schaefer 1953: 227), so individual things are not its subject. Thus, he discussed 
not only geography but all sciences. The phenomena are the only embodiment of 
scientific laws. Therefore, the traditional geography that describes the phenomena 
simply is not a science. This was his statement. The phenomenon that was a subject of 
“true” geography was spatial, and so “all spatial relations, were governed by laws” 
(Schaefer 1953: 227). Regarding a place in which the phenomena existed, he said that 
“For, with successful rise of geophysics, astronomy, and geology, geography can no 
longer deal with the whole earth”, “geography had to be convinced as the science 
concerned with the formulation of the laws governing the spatial distribution of certain 
features on surface of the earth” (Schaefer 1953: 227). He also regarded Humboldt as 
its founder to express his orthodoxy as a geographer. “For that matter, even in the 
introductory chapter of “Kosmos” Humboldt patiently explained to the general public 
the difference between science and cosmology. All science, according him, search for 
laws, or, as the later term goes, are nomothetic” (Schaefer 1953: 234). This comment 
was based on a comparison with Kant’s view, which was adopted by Hartshorne as 
cosmology. Anyway, for him, it is the spatial relations that are a subject of geography: 
“Spatial relations are the ones that matter in geography, and no others. Nonspatial 
relations found among the phenomena in an area the subject matter of other specialist 
such as geologist, anthropologist, or economist” (Schaefer 1953: 228). 
 What are “spatial relations”? He pointed out that “Geography is essentially 
morphological. Purely geographical laws contain no reference to time and change. This 
is not to deny that the spatial structures we explore are, like all structures anywhere, 
the result of processes. But the geographer, for most part, deal with them as he finds 
them, ready made” (Schaefer 1953: 243-244). His “space” was, briefly, a concept of 
morphology, namely, a pattern in contrast to time as a series of changes. “Technically, 
the morphological character of geography finds its expression in its own specific tool, 
maps and cartography correlation” (Schaefer 1953: 244); this gives us a meaning of 
“morphology.” It is also his concept of “pattern” and “space,” which is a shape or an 
outline that is drawn on maps like the frontier, the coastline, a contour line, or any 
boundaries. 
 However, this “space” is not merely an outline of matter. According to him, a 
geographer understands a spatial “structure” as a law. Hence, the “morphological law” 
is not only a static “pattern.” It may be caused by the “pattern,” which is based on 
Christaller’s location theory (1969). Christaller (1969: 17) said that “the basic pattern 
of a relative arrangement is formed by matter either pertaining to the organic or the 
inorganic which enclose a core or center; a centripetal arrangement. It is not merely a 
mode which exists in a human idealistic world, or which is made from an urge to 
arrange, but is organized in actuality by the nature of law in each matter.” He 
attempted to clarify the law in the arrangement of matter through a location theory. 
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According to him, “this study consists of a part of a spatial science, namely geography. 
Therefore, it is vested high ability because it has a more total and comprehended ideas” 
(Christaller 1969: 386). Thus, Christaller considered location theory to be a main part 
of geography as a spatial science. After that, Schaefer regarded the theory as the whole 
of geography, not a part, and interpreted the “arrangement of matter” as a “pattern” 
itself rather than a more general concept. Words such as “space,” “arrangement,” or 
“law” connote an antagonism to Hartshorne’s view that the “region” is unique. Schaefer 
followed Christaller in arguing that geographical phenomena are only an assemblage 
of matter. 
 In this, Schaefer defined geography as a science of “morphological law.” It resulted 
from the exclusion of the “law,” which is considered a subject of another field of 
traditional geography. He classifies laws in traditional geography into three types 
(Schaefer 1953: 248). The first are “the laws of physical geography.” He said that these 
“are not strictly geographical,” and used meteorology based on physics as an example 
as well as agronomy based on biology. The second is the “morphological law” which is 
studied as a kind of social science, and stated that “as far as they are morphological, 
these laws are genuinely geographic.” The third is the “non-morphological law” in the 
other social sciences. Hence, he interpreted traditional geography as a miscellaneous 
field of mixed physical and social sciences, and named the field of “morphological law” 
in the latter “geography.” After all, Schaefer’s “morphological” geography is a subfield 
of the social sciences. “The real danger here is geographical isolationism. For, we have 
also seen that the search for these laws can only proceed in cooperation with the other 
social sciences” (Schaefer 1953: 249). He felt apprehension for the remoteness of 
geography from the whole of the systematic sciences. 
 The above is an outline of Schaefer’s geography. His theory has new definitions of 
geography: (1) geography as the “spatial science” which aims to clarify the 
“morphological laws”; (2) geography as the subfield of a whole of social sciences. This 
feature is a reason for why “exceptionalism” or “quantitative revolution” became the 
“new geography,” and why even schools criticized quantitative geography as not being 
able to abandon a similar theoretical basis. 
 
b. Admiration and criticism by contemporary geography 
 As stated above, this criticism of “exceptionalism” was not strongly considered at first, 
but Bunge (1970), who was an admirer of Schaefer (Sugiura 1991: 305), understood 
that his “morphological” geography is based on geometry. Bunge (1970: 100, 192) said 
“‘spatial’ means not only a distance but also the whole of geometric features on the 
earth’s surface, for instance, shape, dimension, type, distance, connection and more”; 
“we define what is spatial as a geometric thing or movement on the earth’s surface”. 
Thus, he explained the “morphological” concept of space strictly. Schaefer’s philosophy 
8 
 
includes quantitative methodology. Bunge believed that all things can be analyzed 
quantitatively, and said that “if Manhattan Island follows a law for islands, it is only 
different from other islands in each genuine quantitative assemblage of changes” 
(Bunge 1970: 12). Thus, Bunge identified geometry with Schaefer’s theory unrelated to 
mathematical operation. At the same time, it was generalized that Hartshorne’s 
concept of a “unique” region is a theoretical fault of traditional geography. 
 Schaefer’s “space” or “morphology” was welcomed on the basis of the application of 
exact mathematical methodology to geography. Bunge also admired Christaller’s 
theory as his theoretical core. He stated that “if there had been no center place theory, 
it could not have been stated that there was a theoretical geography independent to a 
mother science. Because it produces a new law, geography is one of a basic science, and 
this statement is proved obviously by the center place theory” (Bunge 1970: 145), 
Bunge discovered the theoretical independence of geography in this economic 
geographical theory. Christaller’s theory is based on economics, and hence it is a kind of 
social science. Therefore, Bunge also followed Schaefer’s definition of geography as a 
subfield of social science. This is seen in his scant concern for physical geography. 
A similar theory was received along with a methodological, concrete development by 
Haggett (1978) and others. He also considered both the relationship between 
geography and geometry and the divide between physical geography with human 
beings as an obvious fact. So, he said that “the geometric tradition is the original basis 
of this science for the ancient Greeks” or “geometry provides a chance to connect 
physical geography with humans as new cooperators” (Haggett 1978: 21-22). 
This tendency was strengthened increasingly by Harvey (1979). He regarded the 
concept of space as the theoretical core of geography from the ancient era to today 
(Harvey 1979: 230-231). Then, he separated the “relative space” as “a locational 
character of the material object world” from the “absolute space” as “a container of all 
materials” (Harvey 1979: 215). “A confrontation between Hartshorne and Bunge is also 
understood as a confrontation between absolute space versus relative space” (Harvey 
1979: 230). He understood the “quantitative revolution” as a change of a core concept in 
geography from “absolute space” to “relative” space.1) He recognized Kant as an 
originator of “absolute space” in geography (Harvey 1979: 77, 229) and thought that the 
concept is based on the Euclidean geometric understanding of the phenomena. Thus, 
he insisted on the invalidity of the concept of absolute space. “For the last hundred 
years, the concept of absolute space is not general in the philosophy of science. Kant’s 
idea regarding space and geometry lost the confidence of the discovery of 
non-Euclidean geometry in the first half of the nineteenth century” (Harvey 1979: 229). 
In this way, Schaefer’s “morphological law” was the “relative space” that related 
matters but was separated from it, and was sophisticated enough as a concept to deny 
traditional geography based on “absolute space.” 
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 Harvey likewise distinguished physical from human geography. There are great 
differences between the two. “Concepts in physical geography are deduced from a 
postulate of physics. Because physics and chemistry have more strict theory than other 
sciences and an empirical position that is more trusted than any social science, 
physical geography also has concepts based precisely on human geography (Harvey 
1979: 132-133). This even includes geographical concepts that belong to the physical or 
social sciences for him. This view is developed from Schaefer. According to the 
statement that “a geographical concept of space is embedded in an extensive cultural 
experience” (Harvey 1979: 250), his “geography” is obviously a subfield of the social 
sciences. Thus, an institution in the criticism of “exceptionalism” was sophisticated for 
the “new geography”; finally, it became a subfield built on a high theoretical basis.  
 The “quantitative revolution” is supported by the attentive polishing of the logical 
armor. It was impulsive, and it introduced theories from other fields uncritically 
(Takahashi et al. 1976: 429). However, it did not have the fragility that other schools 
could use to overthrow it. Therefore, criticisms for quantitativism were concentrated in 
the character of “morphological law.” 
Sack (1973), who criticized quantitativism, provided a “relational concept of space,” 
which is unity between geometric physical space and non-geometric matters. Kosaka 
(1975) showed a remit of Schaefer’s “morphology” regarding spatial patterns and 
completed behavioristic studies regarding a spatial process to replace it. He said, “In a 
study of a spatial process, a concept of space has to be defined to grasp the spatial 
behavior of a person. In this case, the concept of space is not the absolute as a container, 
but the relative that is decided as a system of coordinates based on the phenomena” 
(Kosaka 1975: 534). Thus, he also considered space as geometric. These criticisms 
aimed to add the materiality of geographical phenomena to Schaefer’s space. The 
former stated that it should consider materials itself, and the latter focused on the 
processes of the phenomena that caused the “pattern.” However, they did not abandon 
the geometric or “morphological” space, but rather they supported its logic. 
On the other hand, while humanistic geography contrasts with quantitativism, the 
circumstances are similar. Relph (1991: 41-80), for example, regarded space as a 
collective recognition of individuals or groups, and classified it in six types by its 
abstractness; “practical space”, “perceptive space”, “existential space”, 
“constructive/planning space”, “recognititional space”, and “abstract space”. However, 
these types connote a boundary of surrounding matter. Thus, his space is 
“morphological.” He did not criticize Schaefer’s view, but rather its disregard of the 
recognition of the phenomena inside the “space.” Tuan (1993: 179) mentioned a spatial 
structure in various cultures; however, he illustrated it with geometric shapes on a 
plane as “morphological” as the quantitative. Humanistic geography as represented in 
them, in fact, aimed to refocus on subjective elements, but did not leave the theoretical 
10 
 
basis of quantitativism. Rather than leaving it, this school attempted to explain the 
reason why the geometric patterns are understood as a concept of space universally. As 
Yamano (1979: 63) pointed out, humanistic studies adhere to a method that interprets 
its results as “morphological” spatial structures; the same may be said of the concept of 
“place.” Whether “place” is defined in terms of human subjects or others, it must be 
attended with a physical “pattern.” 
In addition, the concept of “spatiality” defined by Soja (1989: 249), who called himself 
a postmodern geographer, also has a “morphological” feature. “Spatiality” is, according 
to Soja, “an embodiment and medium of social life which is the relationship between 
individuals or groups, which has substantive patterns, and which is produced socially.” 
Mizuoka (1997: 826), who adopted Marxism, said that “the space is, at first, a real 
existence which maintains socialization and subjects with geometric attributes”. He 
called it “a common thesis of space.” It is shown as an extensive reception of the 
geometric “morphological” concept. These are only some instances; we suppose that 
there are hardly any views that deny this concept of space. It is like a necessary 
condition of space. The critics of quantitativism no longer seem to be concerned with it. 
Massey (2005), for example, discussed the phenomena in space rather than the concept 
of space itself.  
 How did they deal with the idea of geography as a subfield of the social sciences? In 
the early criticism, there were theories containing physical-geographical features such 
as Sack (1973), or Garnier (1978), and more. After the development of methodology 
respecting behaviorism or humanistic geography, however, geography became focused 
on human or social features even in its basic theories as quoted. If they state that there 
is a restoration of traditional regional geography, it is wholly emphasized as a social 
science (Morikawa 1992). Morikawa (2002: 232) said “for human geography…is 
positioned firmly in social science; first of all, we have to use a common language and 
concept”; he expressed apprehension about geography’s dependence on adjacent 
disciplines. It is difficult to find a consideration for physical geography in current 
geographical theories. 
 The “quantitative revolution,” or changes on a geographical basis produced by the 
criticism of “exceptionalism,” is covering our discipline even now. Both the quantitative 
school and its opponents continue to rely on the “morphological”, “geometric” space and 
the view of geography as a subfield of the social sciences. It was, perhaps, a new theory 
that became the “quantitative revolution.”   
 The above is, however, just half of the basic theory of geography. The nature of 
geography, at least, was clarified through so-called “traditional” theories before 
Hartshorne, who was attacked by Schaefer. This shows the problem at the core of this 
comparison of old and new. 
 
11 
 
2. Hartshorne and the completion of traditional geography 
Although its reputation is not established, Schaefer is often mentioned as the 
philosophical initiator of the “quantitative revolution.” In comparison, Hartshorne is 
not well understood today; the word “exceptionalism” always accompanies him, and the 
“quantitative revolution” overcame his theory generally in the current history of 
geography. Is it correct that he calls traditional theories merely “exceptionalism”? In 
this, we will reinterpret Hartshorne’s view according to “The Nature of Geography” 
(Hartshorne 1957/original 1939) as his main work, and “Perspectives on the Nature of 
Geography” (Hartshorne 1975/original 1959), which was written as an answer to 
Schaefer. 
 It was, indeed, a kind of paranoia that was a motive for Schaefer’s criticism of 
Hartshorne (Sugiura 1991: 315-316). Notwithstanding his impure motive, the criticism 
was interpreted as epochal, perhaps, because Hartshorne’s theory in “The Nature of 
Geography” was the thorough essence of traditional geography; he coordinated 
traditional basic theories on his work, hence unsolved problems were condensed. In 
effect, Schaefer casually opposed Hartshorne, who clarified old problems in geography 
at first. If Hartshorne’s work was less incomplete than in reality, then Schaefer’s 
criticism would not be a criticism, much less a “revolution”. It is, therefore, Hartshorne 
himself who was the true originator of the criticism of “exceptionalism” or “quantitative 
revolution.” However, we cannot evaluate it without an examination of his theory. In 
the following, Hartshorne’s views are shown in comparison with Schaefer. 
 Hartshorne’s view of geography and science was totally incompatible with Schaefer’s. 
He refuted “exceptionalism” in his “The Nature of Geography”, which was published 
before Schaefer’s attack a dozen or so years ago; he discussed a science or a study itself 
eloquently in saying that “a science is the only one naturally, which is divided 
arbitrarily because of a limit on human ability” or “it should be a distortion of a science 
that is an attempt that arranges distributive sciences and its parts through a simple 
system that differs a social science from a physical science, and both have the 
distributives of various classes in themselves” (Hartshorne 1957: 427). He thought that 
the dichotomy between a physical science and a social science, as Schaefer stated, is 
merely a kind of custom. He rejected the idea that treats the science of “morphological 
law” in the social sciences as a distortion of all sciences. Thus, Schaefer’s view that 
geography is one of the distributive sciences could not be permitted for him. In fact, 
Hartshorne also considered that the dichotomy between physical geography and 
human geography is an empty idea. It is shown actually by following his words that 
“geography as a whole is classified as neither the physical nor the human, and cannot 
be divided into two groups”, “because geography has to examine the complex 
phenomena in reality, it is impossible to divide between the physical and the human” 
(Hartshorne 1957: 427). “In geography, a character of the earth is not purely human 
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nor physical, but a complex of them genuinely” (Hartshorne 1975: 66). He denied, 
therefore, the “criticism that geography is dualistic because it contains both the human 
phenomena and the non-human” (Hartshorne 1957: 427), and warned that “it will 
cause a lot of handicaps regarding development in study that make a difference 
between two special features between the human and the non-human” (Hartshorne 
1975: 61) after it became an actuality for Schaefer. 
 Of course, he didn’t ignore the meaning of geography as a science. For him, geography 
is a field that has an intrinsic value which is the same as or higher than the other 
sciences. As Schaefer pointed out, in subjects of geography, there are many features 
that are regarded as physical sciences and social sciences. However, these systematic 
sciences introduce their results through different purposes and methods for each. If the 
inconsistent results accumulate, they cannot be substituted and can be considered 
geography (Hartshorne 1975: 40). Accordingly, Hartshorne focused on the consistent 
“total reality,” and defined geography as “the empirical science field that is requested 
for the study of reality” (Hartshorne 1975: 40). “Exceptionalism,” as Schaefer called it, 
was part of Hartshorne’s view of geography as the “integral science,” but Hartshorne 
replied that it is the strange “integral” that is Schaefer’s “social science.”  
 What constitutes “total reality”? Hartshorne (1957: 32, 56-70) explained that this 
concept was founded by Kant, Humboldt, and Ritter; it was also adopted consistently in 
geography. Likewise, Noma (1963: 84-85, 92) stated that “all things connect the whole 
in the organic view of nature” and mentioned the “the whole lived” and “the universal 
organism” of Humboldt, or “the global organism”, “the organic whole” of Ritter as 
examples. These concepts were discussed in modern geography zealously; Ratzel (2006: 
157) said “there is only the space of the earth”, and Vidal de la Blache also regarded it 
as a core concept of geography that is “unité terrestre” as “the concept that the earth is 
one of the whole which obeys universal law that provides special instances and 
maintains an order in its parts” (Blache 1940: 44); de la Blache also asserts that 
geography considers “the universal matters related to an organism on the earth” 
(Blache 1940: 45). Moreover, Hettner (1991: 174) declared that “the subject of 
geography is, initially, a whole of the earth.” Cholley (1967: 4, 10) pointed out that “the 
nature of the geographical feature” is what “emerges always as a complex combination, 
or the convergence of various factors,” and “the field of geographical complex, namely 
the subjective field of geography corresponds to a surface of the earth itself.” 
Hartshorne succeeded this tradition: his “total reality” is “the earth” as the others 
mentioned. He said, “a whole as a great region is not the whole in actuality, but merely 
a part of the world as our unique and perfect whole” (Hartshorne 1957: 457). It cannot, 
however, be a sufficient explanation that provides a concept of the earth as a subject of 
geography. The “total reality” or “total complex” is unanalyzable in actual studies, even 
the theoretical. Consequently, a geographer “must discover the mother concept of 
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studies consistently and rationally” (Hartshorne 1975: 44). 
 There is no doubt that the theorists mentioned did not find satisfaction in these 
comprehensive but empty definitions of geography. They claimed the practical concept 
in order to understand the nature of the earth as a “whole”. Its typical example is 
Ritter’s “space,” that is “the spaces are filled terrestrially on the earth” (Ritter 1991: 83). 
While it is “a concept called ‘landschaft’ in current meaning,” “he didn’t use the word 
‘landschaft’ but referred to the geographical ‘individuals’” (Noma 1963: 97-98). Likewise, 
Vidal de la Blache (1940: 45-48) utilized the concept of “milieu.” Hettner (1991: 182) 
defined the practical subject as a “spatial arrangement” based on Ritter. He commented 
that “geography considers a character of various areas or places, to use Ritter’s phrase, 
“the spaces are filled terrestrially on the earth,” hence “continents, nations, regions, 
and districts as themselves” (Hettner 1991: 183).  
 Hartshorne did not consider the earth itself an actual subject of geography. He 
adopted Hettner’s “spatial arrangements” rather than other confused concepts such the 
“landschaft” or “environment/milieu” (Hartshorne 1957: 171; 1975: 87). In this, he 
called it a “space” universally and explained geography in actuality. A clear expression 
of his view: “in geography, factors of integration are space—although they occur at 
almost the same time, there are connections among the phenomena that relate to each 
other spatially (namely in relative locations)” (Hartshorne 1957: 325). 
 We should pay attention to the fact that this “space” is a concept for regulating a 
“region”, which is requested to integrate the inner “space”. In addition, it is this “region” 
that is the subject of geography for him. This concept can explain the nature of “the 
world as our unique and perfect Whole.” “In order to cover the world, it is recognized 
that the land area which can be differed from others has fields that change variously; 
these make so-called regions as spaces as units” (Hartshorne 1975: 193-194). Thus, the 
basis of Hartshorne’s geography has a theoretical core as a “space” or “region”. However, 
what do these concepts have as definitions?  
 It is essential that his “space” is not an arbitrary classification. It is “an integration of 
the phenomena in spatial connection” and “the nature of a geographical concept” 
(Hartshorne 1957: 267). To one degree or another, this “space” is unified among 
different phenomena like an organism in anatomy2) (Hartshorne 1975: 176). Therefore, 
the largest thing in the “space” and the “region” enclosed by the “space” is the whole of 
the earth. He mentioned “an experience of regions on the earth, as the whole brings a 
concept of human lebensraum in reality” (Hartshorne 1957: 318). The lebensraum, 
namely a “living space”, is a systematic integration dividing others as a whole that 
human beings can experience. Thus, he defined the radical subject of geography as not 
“the earth”, but “total reality” and characterized “the world as our unique and perfect 
Whole”. The earth is not the whole until it becomes recognized as the “lebensraum”. 
“The world as the subject of geography—even in the places where no one lives—is 
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meant to be observed as a human world” (Hartshorne 1975: 54). Without this dividing, 
even the earth is merely a chaotic integration of phenomena, and it cannot be 
discriminated from other parts of the universe.  
 Thus, his “space” and “region” requests integration with the whole. So, the “region” is, 
as he said, “a part of the actual universe which contains enormous physical and 
non-physical phenomena related to each other in its interior—in short, everything in 
one region is contained” (Hartshorne 1957: 175). There is a complex unity and a 
phenomena regardless of its kind. Geography “doesn’t need to except whatever 
phenomenon belongs to a specific category”, but there is no “logical basis which gives 
priority or higher position to a phenomenon belonging to a specific category” 
(Hartshorne 1957: 246). It is “basically irrational” (Hartshorne 1957: 226-227) and is 
even more an interpretation that a substance of a “region” is only material or a 
materialistic phenomenon. He stressed that “the nonmaterial phenomena are no less 
objective than the material facts” (Hartshorne 1957: 220). 
 In this respect, his view was contrary to Schaefer’s contemporary materialistic idea, 
which found a sort of “law” on the arrangement of matter. Hartshorne thought that in 
the same way that space “must connect a material basis”, all nonmaterial phenomena 
such as “a house, a language, a custom, a political loyalty, or a thought” is inevitably 
located on the surface (Hartshorne 1957: 224). 
 It is needless to say that the “region” is an extremely complex concept, and its nature 
is indefinite. According to Hartshorne (1957: 458), however, the concept of “region” has 
no nature originally because it is not a phenomenon. Thus, he regarded the “region” as 
“an intellectual framework that only covers the phenomena, which is an abstract 
concept that does not exist in reality” (Hartshorne 1957: 458). It is impossible neither 
“to be compared with other phenomena as a sort of phenomenon”, or “to be classified in 
systematic general concepts”, or to state “a law about a relation of other phenomena” 
(Hartshorne 1957: 458). 
The “region” as a “unique” concept introduces such logic. Hartshorne (1957: 458-459) 
defined the concept with the following: “the region itself cannot be studied from a 
viewpoint of general concepts, and is unique in respect of an einmalig combination of 
the phenomena related to each other”. Although it is not real substance, the “region” 
unifies the phenomena inside itself, which is inseparable from these phenomena. 
If the concept acquires approval as the subject of geography, the nature of geography 
is also determined naturally in Hartshorne’s logic. It is a so-called “naïve science” 
which “examines the reality from the naïve position that looks at matters arranged and 
related as they stand”; this is contrary to the artificial and more forced procedures of a 
systematic science that is studied which abstracts a special kind of phenomenon from 
its real sites (Hartshorne 1957: 433). Thus, geography as an “ideographic” or regional 
geographic study is formulated. He explained logically the traditional viewpoint of 
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geography by the concepts of “space”, “region”, and the “whole”. 
 As stated above, Hartshorne’s view of geography is summarized as having the subject 
as the union of the “whole” between the concept of “space/region” and the phenomena it 
encloses. These are the concepts that are deducted for the explanation of the theses of 
traditional geography. Next, we should pay attention to the similarity between the 
“space/region” and the “morphological/geometric” space after Schaefer. Both are made 
by the arrangement of the phenomena, and enclose it. There are only two differences; 
(1) whether the interiors are considered as the subject, and (2) whether the interiors 
are radically materialistic. Schaefer separated the “space/region” from the internal 
phenomena. Their ideas are not the same, but Schaefer’s “morphological” concept is 
based on Hartshorne’s “space/region”, and Schaefer criticized this conceptual 
disorganization. 
After all, it is the greatest change of “quantitative revolution” that is the division of 
the physical geography from the human. As stated above, Hartshorne denied the 
dichotomy because of the extensive subjects of geography. The quantitativism, however, 
permitted geography to remove own physical features. 
 
3. The concept of space as a radical problem in geography 
 Reviewing the history of geography as above, we understand that geographers have 
supposed a similar concept of space consistently as a theoretical core of geography. This 
concept hardly changed through the “quantitative revolution”; it only excludes a 
connection between the space and the inner phenomena that was defined by 
Hartshorne. However, if there are no theoretical problems in the space, isn’t there no 
end to the theoretical arguments although there has been a consistent basic concept? In 
this section, we clarify a character of the concept of the “space”, and point out its 
theoretical problems. First, we consider the space advocated by Hartshorne and 
Schaefer on a philosophical perspective again. 
 To begin from the conclusion, the space which geographers suppose is similar to 
Aristotelianism; it is related to Aristotle’s concepts of space and his theories of form 
(eidos) and material (hylé). It is, however, difficult to approve the statement because of 
the common view. Didn’t Kant found the basis of modern geography, which is developed 
by Hartshorne or traditional geographers? Didn’t Schaefer criticize its “exceptionalism” 
and establish the theoretical basis of contemporary geography? Or, has Newton’s 
absolute space, which was supposed in the former theory, been superseded by the 
non-Euclidean related space? These questions are expected. Although there are many 
inaccurate conceptions, we should still introduce the classic concept of space in Western 
philosophy in order to address such confusion. 
 Aristotle was one of the originators of the theory of space in the Western world. He 
defined “space” as a place that concrete matters occupy in his “Physics” (Aristotle 
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1968b). This means an outline or boundary of a matter itself (Jammer 1980), and is not 
identical but inseparable from matter. However, space does not always enclose matter; 
for example, the matter (water) that occupies space interchanges repeatedly in the 
river. This space is related to his theories of form and material. Both “form” and 
“material” were concepts of substance in ancient Greece; the former refers to an 
essential difference of something from other substances, the latter is a dependent 
attribute of the former. Aristotle’s theory of substance (1968a: 241-242) in his 
“Metaphysics” is based on these two concepts. According to him, there is a split in the 
“form” his a body as the “material” concerning a man. On the other hand, concerning 
matter, its shape is the “form” and its quality is the “material”. Considering a round 
bronze, its geometric outline as “round” is the “form” and what it is made from as 
“bronze” is the “material”. Man has a “spirit”; therefore, he is distinguished from other 
individuals. The bronze has round “shape”; therefore, it is also distinguished from 
other bronze matter.3) Both the “spirit” and “shape” are identities of substances. 
Focusing on the materiality-related geographical themes, it is based on similar logic 
used in both his theories of space and form. Both his “space” and “form” have an 
attribute of an outline that enclose something of matter. The only difference is that 
“space” is not matter, but “form” is the body concept of matter. His concept of “space” 
has the same meaning as an outline with “form,” though it is not related to “material”. 
 In the western world, an objection against Aristotle’s space had not emerged until 
Descartes as one of the fathers of modern philosophy. He denied Aristotle’s concepts 
and provided a new idea for a concept of space. His concept is known by the following: 
“it is obvious that the extension of space (of inner place) is not different from the 
extension of matter” (Descartes 1964: 107). So, there are no old differences between 
“form” and “material”, or “space” and “matter”; “space” is the “matter” itself. He said 
“there is only one matter in the whole universe because it is recognized by its expansion” 
(Descartes 1964: 113). In extreme terms, he denied that the concept of space exists. 
 Locke (1975: 167), on the contrary, argued for “space as a simple idea”. He considered 
“space” to be the simple idea which is acquired by visual or tactile sensation. For him, 
the concept of space is a kind of recognition of human subjectivity. 
 Leibniz understood space as a relative concept: “the order of matters grasped” 
(Alexander 1956: 69). This concept is nothing but a stipulation about the thing in itself 
(Endo 1992); therefore, it is not a substance. 
  Among such modern philosophers, Newton’s “absolute” had the greatest influence on 
later generations. According to him, space is an attribute of God, which is independent 
to all things, therefore, it will never affect anything, neither be affected (Newton 1995). 
This theory restored “the view which accepts space itself”, that furthermore 
“dominated physics until the mid-19th century” (Mach 1977: 141) in the age when 
Aristotelianism was broke and the concept of space was doubted. 
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After awhile, Kant (1961: 89-96) thought up a unique concept of space. His concept is 
known for its difficulty. He defined it as “the a priori form of the sense”; the only form to 
recognize outer phenomena by the sense, which is “a faculty to receive the 
representation by ways that a person is contacted”. This “space” means “the condition 
which makes phenomena possible”, and contains “all emergences on us” but never is 
related to “the entire thing in itself”. Consequently, it is the way of recognition that is 
given for human beings transcendentally, and related not to objects like matter but to 
human subjects. Kant, however, approved Newtonian mechanics as a correct theory; 
therefore, he never denied Newton’s “absolute space”. However, he interpreted it as 
rather the form of the a priori cognitive faculty than “the attribute of God”. Space is 
immanent in mankind; thus, he supposes that space is independent of outer matter. 
Hence, Kant’s concept of space is kind of like an immanent “absolute space” (Inutake 
2002: 115). 
This is the gist of the classic theories of space in western philosophy. We pay 
attention to space in geography again. Which of these corresponds to Hartshorne’s 
“space” or “region,” which encloses the inner phenomena and is inseparable to them? 
Which of these corresponds to Schaefer’s “morphological law,” which is introduced from 
arrangements of matter and abstract cognition? They are, needless to say, similar to 
Aristotle; Hartshorne’s “space/region” considers inner phenomena as if “form” makes a 
shape of the “material”; Schaefer’s “morphological” concept is like Aristotle’s “space,” 
which surrounds “form”. Other modern concepts of space stated by Descartes, Locke, 
Leibniz, Newton, or Kant are indifferent to “form” as a shape or an outline of matter; 
thus, they are quite unlike geographical space. We cannot recognize this as appropriate 
in Harvey (1979: 230) or Kosaka’s (1975: 534) views, which consider traditional 
geographical space as Newton’s “absolute space”; that it changed to the non-Euclidean 
“relative space” after the “quantitative revolution”. Perhaps their interpretation was 
based on the following consideration. First, Harvey understood the terms “absolute 
space” and “relative space” as contrary between the static and the dynamic. He 
considered that Hartshorne’s “space/region” is “absolute” because it has a “static” area, 
and Schaefer’s “morphological” space or Bunge’s “geometrical” space are “relative” 
because they are formed by the “dynamic” moves of matter. Kosaka’s view was based on 
Harvey’s. However, he defined “absolute space” as occupancy of coordinates 
independent of time and opposed it against the “relative space” as the coordinates that 
are inseparable to time. In Kosaka’s “relative space”, on account of the time-axis, the 
“unique” character of Hartshorne’s “space/region” is not fixed; it is changed from the 
“absolute” to the “relative”. Whatever their rights or wrongs,4) their interpretations are 
not related neither under Newton’s “absolute space” as the metaphysical substance 
independent to all things, nor to Leibniz’s “relative space” as the order forming the 
relations of the universe. These “static” or “dynamic” spaces are not similar to any 
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modern philosopher’s concepts; they are rather like Aristotle’s concept of space. It gives 
the same conclusions for either the “landschaft” or “environment/milieu” before 
Hartshorne, or the schools that criticized quantitativism. Hartshorne (1975: 87) said 
“the concept of ‘natural environment’… is a collective noun among individual and 
complex features, and it is integrated due to being “enclosed”. Judging from this word, 
it is clarified that he regarded the “environment” as Aristotle’s “space” or “form.” 
Theorists in humanistic or postmodern geography did not abandon the “geometric” 
character of space because of concepts like “a place full of meaning” or “spatiality”; 
Aristotle’s “material” supposes the concept of space as “form.” Thus, geography has 
adopted Aristotle’s concept of space as its theoretical core. 
 Accordingly, the changes in the concept of geographical space by the “quantitative 
revolution” were limited. Schaefer allowed the concept of “formal” space, which 
encloses the phenomena as the “material” and unifies them to be independent by his 
statement of “morphological law,” He and the quantitativists separated the traditional 
geography into “pure geography,” which deals with the “formal” or “morphological” 
space and other systematic sciences regarding the phenomena as “material.” It is also 
considered that the criticisms of quantitativism are a kind of revaluation of the 
“material” parts; all of their themes such as human subjectivity or the political-social 
meanings started from a restoration of the concern about the phenomena of inner 
“space” as “form.” Although there were antipathies to extreme positivism of 
quantitativism, they were a movement that aimed to supplement the concept of 
“space/region” that lost its “material” parts (Fig. 1). 
 Thus, in fact, geography has succeeded the ancient concept of space of the past two 
thousand years through varied arguments and a “revolution” regarding its basic theory. 
But, why did it stick to such an old concept? 
 The reason is simple. It will be obvious by reconfirming the above modern 
philosophical concepts of space. Newton’s “absolute space” is a metaphysical substance 
called the “limbs of the God”; it is impossible to be the subject of geography because 
nothing relates to it. The space as an a priori form  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The geographical concept of space throughout the “quantitative revolution”
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of sense that was advocated by Kant is also too metaphysical to adopt as the basis of 
geography.5) As concerns Leibniz’s “relative space” as the order of matters, it is 
insufficient to explain the nature of geography; almost all sciences deal with the “order 
of matter”. It is not “order” but “matter” as in Descartes’ view, so the conclusion is not 
changed because “matter” is a general subject of the sciences. Locke’s concept, as a 
simple idea, is rather a theme of psychology.  
Their concepts of space, of course, corresponded to the logic of modern sciences that 
they constructed. Although there are strong contrasts among Descartes, Newton, and 
Kant, all of their ideas have a practical point in common: scientists can deny space by 
studying physics. Leibniz’ concept was related to mathematics; Locke’s psychology was 
considered too. Thus, it is natural that geography has adhered to Aristotle’s ancient 
concept of space because Aristotelianism and geography are contemporary scholarship. 
 We, however, should be careful to note that this geographical space does not accord 
perfectly with Aristotle’s concept, though they are similar. Aristotle’s space encloses 
only one matter strictly. It never encloses the “total reality” containing innumerable 
phenomena like geographical space. The concepts of both “form” and “material” are also 
concerned with only one substance. Therefore, Hartshorne’s “space/region” which 
encloses the phenomena is not Aristotle’s; it cannot be demonstrable because its inner 
phenomena are not unified. Schaefer (1953: 246) criticized this confusion on its 
definition. However, his “morphological” space also has the same difficulty in that it is 
made from arrangements of the disunited matters. Thus, the concept of space that has 
been adopted throughout the history of geography at least for two centuries is very 
unique in a certain sense.6) The reason why it is very unique is due to its indefiniteness. 
What on earth are the grounds that this “space” encloses phenomena that are not even 
one matter? What explains the arrangements of various matter that are equal to the 
substantive “shape”? This confusion of concepts accounts for arguments on the 
theoretical basis of geography that includes a criticism of “exceptionalism”. If the 
concept of space was not confusing, the discussions mentioned above would not have 
been unnecessary.  
Should we abandon it? Of course not. It is no different from disregarding geography 
itself. This geographical space, though it does not have enough theoretical 
sophistication, has expressed the real subject of geography systematically. 
 Thus, we should try to explain the concept of space accurately upon considering the 
theoretical basis of geography. This paper focuses on Zhu-zi Xue because it has a 
suitable theory for geography; it is expected that Zhu-zi Xue will clarify the true nature 
of geographical space. We believe that many unfruitful arguments are over and both 
the nature of geography and its independence are undoubted if this concept of space is 
defined strictly. 
 
21 
 
III. The Concept of Space in Neo-Confucianism  
 As shown in the foregoing chapter, this paper aims to explain the character of 
geographical space as a kind of theoretical core that has been adopted even now, and to 
construct a consistent basic theory of it. In this way, we will illustrate a fundamental 
aspect of the nature of geography. As also stated above, however, it is a plain fact that 
there have not yet been sufficient discussions about space. Despite this situation, if we 
said suddenly that this paper defines space, perhaps no one would believe our 
statement. This space, in spite of the philosophical confusion surrounding it, has been 
the basis on which geography conforms to the modern systematic sciences. It is almost 
impossible to use the modern concepts of space such as that of Descartes or Newton for 
geographical space; this is shown by the “quantitative revolution” and succeeding 
schools. Then, has the discussion about space reached a limit? 
 Of course, new theories of space are brought forth from various quarters. This 
tendency became conspicuous after the “quantitative revolution,” and the theories have 
been imported from philosophy, physics, mathematics, phycology, economics, sociology, 
and more. Although these foreign theories of space have had a certain influence on 
contemporary geography, they were insufficient in radically developing the concept of 
space. We cannot find a “revolution” of the traditional concept of geographical space 
therein, with the exception of Harvey (1979). Then, neither modern concepts of space 
nor new foreign theories suit the character of geography. In this situation, if we venture 
to give a sophisticated definition of geographical space, we should not do so in the same 
way that has been used in the past. 
 Almost all fruits of Western sciences have been adopted for contemporary geography. 
The reason why geography uses Aristotle’s concept of space, which was approved before 
the mediaeval period, is that it is reasonable for explaining geography itself. If we bring 
in the new concepts and convert them to an elegant definition, we have to examine a 
novel system of theory that has not yet been imported by anyone. Therefore, we focus 
on the Zhu-zi Xue (朱子學). There are few theoretical concerns about not only the 
Zhu-zi Xue but also the entire Eastern sciences now; Senda (2008) is one of the rare 
exceptions, although his attempt remains in the early stage. 
 What is the Zhu-zi Xue? It is very difficult to answer this question in a word, but if we 
had to introduce it briefly, we can say that the Zhu-zi Xue is the theory of 
Neo-Confucianism by Zhu-xi (朱熹 ) and one of the completions of Confucianism 
developed in the Song period. This theory was also named the “Dao Xue (道學),” or the 
“Li Xue (理學)” according to its core concept, and was characterized by its systematic 
logic, which explains the total reality, from the entire universe to the subtlety of human 
feelings. It originates from the so-called “Bei Song Wu Zi (北宋五子)”: “Zhou Dun-Yi (周
敦頤),” “Cheng Yi (程頤),” “Cheng Hao (程顥),” “Zhang Zai (張載),” and “Shao Yong (邵
雍),” and has been a great influence for Eastern Asia. However, the names “Dao Xue” or 
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“Li Xue” involve not only the theory of Zhu Xi but also the other theories of 
Neo-Confucianism, so we call the theory of Zhu Xi the “Zhu-zi Xue” in order to avoid 
confusion. 
 Then, which concepts of space are provided in the Zhu-zi Xue? If we could show this 
using earlier studies, our discussion would be easy, however there are few studies 
about space in the Zhu-zi Xue or in Chinese philosophy. For example, Oshio’s (1979) 
“Ju-mon Ku-kyo Shu-go (儒門空虚聚語)” is one of the classic examples, and Liu (1992) 
surveyed theories of space and time through Chinese philosophy. Yamada (1978) 
analyzed the Zhu-zi Xue as a physical science, astronomy, and cosmology. Kinoshita 
(1999) mentioned the concept of time in the Zhu-zi Xue. Horiike (2002) contains a 
discussion about the reception of the concept of Neo-Confucianism by Western 
philosophers, and Imai (1958) also contains important indications about the Zhu-zi Xue 
metaphysics. Besides these, there are other ideas about Zhu-Xi such as those of 
Onodera et al. (1978), Miura (1997), Ohama (1997), Yasuda (1976), Yamane (1983), and 
so on. However, they did not focus on the concept of space in the Zhu-zi Xue, nor of 
course touch on the basis of geography. Thus, we have to analyze the concept ofspace in 
the Zhu-zi Xue in order to apply it to geography. Then, in this chapter, we examine this 
theory of space in Zhu Xi’s works. 
 We use the following materials. First, we rely on the “Zhou-Yi Ben-Yi (周易本義),” 
which is a commentary on the “Yi Jing (易經),” by Zhu Xi. According to Imai (1958: 序・
一), the “Yi Jing” or “Zhou Yi (周易)” as one of the Five Classics, or “Wu Jing (五經)” of 
Confucianism, is the source of Confucian theory and the center of metaphysics 
involving the theory of space, and “has preceded other Classics and been the principle 
of them.” In addition, “the radical theoretical expressions of Confucians have been 
published as the commentary of this ‘Yi Jing.’” Especially, we can find a systematic 
cosmology or metaphysical theory in the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan (繋辭上傳)” as one of the 
“Shi Yi (十翼),” which is traditionally considered as the ten commentaries on the body of 
“Zhou Yi” by Confucius. Then, this paper pays attention to Zhu Xi’s commentary on the 
“Shi Yi” as the basis of the theory of space in Neo-Confucianism (we use the “Yuan Ben 
Zhou Yi Ben Yi (原本周易本義)” (朱熹 1983) in a facsimile edition of “Wen-Yuan Ge 
Si-Ku Quan-Shu (文淵閣四庫全書)”). Furthermore, we quote many sentences from the 
“Zhu-zi Yu Lei (朱子語類)” (朱・黎 1962: 正中書局本), which are the analects of Zhu Xi as 
the essence of his thought. We also use other Chinese literature as the need arises. 
When using direct quotes, we show the source and pages in each note. 
 
1. “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li”—the internalized space-time— 
 
a. Interpretation of “Tian-Wen” “Di-Li” before Zhu Xi 
 When dealing with concepts of space in Chinese philosophy such as that in the Zhu-zi 
23 
 
Xue, we confront the problem of which concepts correspond to the Western word known 
as “space.” In fact, this problem arises in not only Chinese philosophy but also Western 
philosophy, and not only for “space” but also for other concepts. It is merely an 
assemblage of the problems of differences in various languages. Then, as mentioned in 
chapter II, there is a certain common view about the character of the modern Western 
concepts of space. On the contrary, concepts in the Zhu-zi Xue or in other works of 
Chinese philosophy have sunk into oblivion even in Eastern Asia where they were 
taught as part of basic education. Hence, in order to examine the concept of space in the 
Zhu-zu Xue, we should identify “space” as a Chinese concept.  
 As Aristotle is behind the Western concept of space, origins of “space” can be found in 
Chinese philosophy as “Yu-Zhou (宇宙),” which at present generally means the universe 
or outer space. It appeared in the “Shi-zi (尸子)” (汪 1877) and the “Wen-zi (文子)” (李
2003), which were written in the 4th century BC when Aristotle (coincidentally) was 
active, and was famed as the word in the “Huai-Nan-zi (淮南子)” (劉 1919), which was 
written in the 2nd century BC. According to the “Huai-Nan-zi,” it means infinite 
space-time, like Newton’s absolute space and time, and it is defined as follows: “Zhou 
(宙) is the expanse from the past to the future, and Yu (宇) is the expanse of the four 
quarters and above and below” 7). 
 The “Dao (道),” which also appeared in the “Huai-Nan-zi,” is defined as a concept of 
space (but not time) further details. The “Huai-Nan- zi” says that, “Originally, ‘Dao’ 
covers the heaven and supports the earth. It is diffused in all directions, so that both its 
height and depth are unable to be measured. However, it enshrouds the heaven and the 
earth in its interior, and gives ‘Wu-Xing (無形),’ which means the formless cause, to the 
universe” 8). In short, “Dao” is the infinite diffusional space that gives birth to the 
universe. 
 Thus, the ancient Chinese concept of space is different from Aristotle’s concept. It is 
considered not as Aristotle’s “form” of space, which is related to formations of matter, 
but as only the field of physical beings, like Newton’s concept, while it is not the 
“absolute,” which is independent of all things as the limbs of God because it, especially 
“Dao,” causes all physical beings. Anyway, there is a unique Chinese concept of space 
that is unlike the Western concepts. 
 Then, what is the concept that was defined as “space” by Zhu Xi? He found his concept 
of space in the word that geographers never leave rather than “Yu-Zhou” or “Dao.” It is 
nothing but “Di-Li (地理),” which at present means geography itself. Here, we survey 
the change in meaning of “Di-Li” before Zhu Xi. 
 The word “Di-Li” first appeared in the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” of “Yi Jing,” as mentioned 
above. “Yi Jing” said “looking up to it and finding ‘Tian-Wen (天文),’ looking down to it 
and finding ‘Di-Li,’ the cause of ‘You-Ming (幽明)’ can be known”9), so that a person 
understands the process of both the light side (Ming) and dark side (You) of the world 
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through observation of “Tian-Wen,” which means astronomy or astronomical 
phenomena, and “Di-Li.” This sentence, at a glance, seems to show the positivistic 
methodology of the research into the causes of phenomena by observation. However, we 
should pay attention to the fact that there were no definitions of these words 
“Tian-Wen,” “Di-Li,” or “You-Ming”; we only know that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” are a 
pair, and that “You-Ming” is recognized by observing them. In order to know the 
definition of these words, we have to examine the commentaries of “Yi Jing.” 
The earliest commentary on “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” appeared in the “Han Shu (漢書)” 
(班・顏 1983) written by Ban Gu (班固). He defined “Tian-Wen” very briefly as “the sun, 
the moon, and other stars, namely the illuminants that are looked upon. ‘Di-Li’ means 
mountains, rivers, seas, and wetlands, namely where various matter are born, and 
then propagated”10). This does not seem to be a sophisticated definition. Facing such 
views, we are impelled to vindicate this definition by saying that because the “Han Shu” 
was not a commentary on “Yi Jing” originally but a history, it is inevitable that the 
definition is insufficient. Such a perplexity, however, will be quickly solved by again 
quoting Hartshorne’s “The Nature of Geography” about “lebensraum,” which is the 
basis of the logical union of the earth, the radical subject of traditional geography, as 
the whole of human experiences, yet by quoting a greater portion than what is quoted 
in chapter II. Hartshorne said as follows. “An experience of regions on the earth as a 
whole brings a concept of human lebensraum in real. On the most ordinary and the 
most obvious occasions, representative of ‘lebensraum’ are the earth’s surface, the sun 
and moon, and the stellar world as a part of visible space” (Hartshorne 1957: 318). 
This definition that “the earth’s surface, the sun and moon, and the stellar world” as 
“the most ordinary and the most obvious occasions” almost corresponds with both 
“Tian-Wen” “and “Di-Li.” Recalling that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” are objects of 
observation in “Yi Jing,” we understand that it is not a coincidental conjunction. The 
brief definition by the “Han Shu” expressed the world as the objects of experience and 
observation, like Hartshorne’s idea. 
 This is, however, no more than an unphilosophical definition, although “Tian-Wen” 
and “Di-Li” were considered as concepts having a geographical aspect. Genuine 
commentary on these two concepts did not appear until the Tang period when Kong 
Ying-Da (孔穎達) wrote “Zhou Yi Zhu Shu (周易注疏)” (王 et al., 1983). Kong Ying-Da 
defined “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” as follows.  
 
There are heavenly bodies in the sky, and their orderly arrangements form 
patterns. Hence, these patterns are called as “Tian-Wen” (the word Wen “文” 
contains the meaning of “a pattern.” Translating “Tian-Wen” word for word, it 
means “patterns in the heaven”). There are mountains, rivers, plains, and 
wetlands, and they have orderly arrangements that form patterns. Hence, 
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these patterns are called “Di-Li” (the word Li “理” also contains the meaning of 
“a pattern.” “Di-Li” literally means “patterns on the earth”). Then, the word “Gu 
(故 cause)” in the sentence “hence, the cause of ‘You-Ming’ can be known” means 
the cause of a generation of both facts and matter. Observing “Tian-Wen” and 
“Di-Li” by the principle of “Yi (易),” we will know “You,” which are formless 
beings, and “Ming,” which are material beings, and their meanings and 
causes11).  
 
Here, Kong Ying-Da regarded “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” not as the heavenly bodies or the 
surface of the earth like the “Han Shu,” but as the patterns of the orderly 
arrangements of phenomena. Moreover, he considered that the causes of forming the 
phenomena both on the earth and in the heaven could be clarified by observing these 
patterns. Indeed, he abstracted the geometric patterns or relations from the world as 
“lebensraum.” His interpretation is just like Schafer ’s “morphological” space as 
geometric patterns of the phenomena. Because the result was a match for the theories 
of present geography, Yu (于1990: 17) commented on Kong Ying-Da’s “Zhou Yi Zhu Shu” 
that “the formation of ‘Di-Li’ (by Kong Ying-Da) hastened the integration of knowledge 
and gave the law to them” and that “it is the great progress of Chinese geography,” 
although this is the first commentary about “Di-Li.” 
 After Kong Ying-Da appeared, commentaries on both words “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” 
increased gradually, and then increased rapidly after the Song period. Of course we do 
not mention them one by one; they have various and sophisticated definitions. For 
example, “Yi Jing Jie (易經解)” (朱 1995) written by Zhu Zhang-Wen (朱長文), who was 
born in the Northern Song period, said  
 
The reason why heaven “Tian” is called patterns “Wen” is that relations such as 
the length and breadth or the angles of the location where heavenly bodies are 
observed have clear orderly patterns…the reason why the earth “Di” is called 
patterns “Li” is that relations like that between the high ground and the low, or 
between the sources and the ends of rivers, are also clear and orderly12).  
 
He defined both “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” as the relative locational relations among 
matter that can be illustrated as geometric patterns. His definition was based on Kong 
Ying-Da, while he further considered the celestial longitude and latitude of heaven, the 
heights of static matter, and the origins and destinations of dynamic matter on the 
earth were hence more modernistic. After these, commentators appeared who were 
sympathetic with the history of the concept of geographical space after the 
“quantitative revolution” such as Su Shi (蘇軾), who interpreted “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” 
as merely epistemological classifications (蘇 1983), and Zhu Zhen (朱震 ), who 
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interpreted them as having the appearance of a metaphysical principle (朱震 1983). 
Thus, the definition of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” grew more sophisticated, and achieved 
one of the ultimate definitions through Zhu Xi’s commentary, “Zhou Yi Ben Yi,” on 
which this paper focuses.    
 
b. Zhu Xi’s interpretation of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” 
 How did Zhu Xi define “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” in “Zhou Yi Ben Yi?” We can find this in 
his commentary. He noted that “Tian-Wen” means that which has day and night, up 
and down, while “Di-Li” means that which has south and north, height and depth” 13). 
His definition, as you see, is extremely short in the original “天文則有晝夜上下，地理則
有南北高深”. It is a very short sentence of sixteen characters, while these two comments 
point out that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” are a kind of space-time concept. The words “day 
and night, up and down” are a union of both infinite time, which consists of the 
continual circulation of day and night, and infinite space, which consists of the upward 
and downward diffusion of the universe. The words “south and north, height and depth” 
express finite space, which consists of the horizontal and vertical expanse of the earth. 
These laconic comments, however, will be doubted and criticized due to their 
minimalism. Then, we confirm that Zhu Xi’s concepts are truly equivalent to the 
space-time concept and that their meanings have been greatly advanced, by referring 
to the Zhu-zi Xue. 
 First, there is a doubt that the words “up and down” in the comment about “Tian-Wen” 
mean not the expanse of space but merely up-and-down motions. However, it is 
sufficient to quote Zhu Xi’s saying that “‘Tian-Wen’ has its half on the up side, so that it 
must have the other half on the down side” 14). He declared that “Tian-Wen” is a space 
like an expanse that diffuses upward and downward. 
Next, the interpretation that “day and night” is a concept of time may be doubtful if 
we do not give a supplementary explanation. It is also corroborated by Zhu Xi’s sayings. 
For instance, he remarks that “the concept of ‘Dong-Jing (動靜)’ as the dynamic and the 
static is just like ‘day and night,’ and the concept of ‘Yin-Yang’ is just like the expanse of 
north, south, east, and west. Then, the words written by Zhou Don-Yi (in “Tai-Ji 
Tu-Shuo 太極圖説”) ‘once move, once stop’ concern time, and the words separated as 
‘Ying’ and ‘Yan’ concern location” 15), and Imai’s view of this sentence is that (1958: 421) 
“‘Dong-Jing’ is explained as temporal and successional like ‘day and night,’ and 
‘Ying-Yan’ is explained as spatial and directional like north, south, east, and west.” The 
statement by Kinoshita (1999: 421), who analyzed Zhu Xi’s theory of time, says that, 
“for Zhu Xi, it is the absolute and fundamental rhythmic progression of circulation of 
‘Ying-Yan’ that appears as one time throughout the universe that is time as the changes 
of day and night.” 
 Besides, some people may consider that “up and down” or “south and north, height 
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and depth” are not space but expanses of material phenomena. However, Zhu Xi 
defined such materials in space as “Xing-Xiang (形象),” so that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” 
are distinguished from these as entire concepts that contain all physical things. 
Looking at “Zhou Yi Ben Yi,” we can find the sentence “‘Xiang’ is the sort to which 
either the sun, the moon, or other stars belong, and that ‘Xing’ is the sort to which 
mountains, rivers, animals, and plants belong” 16). It is clear that Zhu Xi did not 
consider these material concepts as concepts of space or time because they are not 
areas such as “Di-Li” in the “Han Shu,” which is defined as “mountains, rivers, seas, 
and wetlands,” but merely materials regardless of the their attributes. His “Xing” is the 
heavenly bodies that are separated from “Tian-Wen,” and his “Xiang” is the phenomena 
on the earth that are separated from “Di-Li.” This discrimination is similar to Ritter ’s 
view that spaces on the earth are different from the “filling” of the phenomena there. 
Ritter (1991: 86) said, “the spatial fillings on the earth, as are generally known, consist 
of two forms as solid or liquid, and dynamic or static matter.” Here, comparing Ritter ’s 
“filling” in his spaces (see chapter II) with Zhu Xi’s “Xing,” which fills “Di-Li,” we 
confirm that there is a strange correspondence; Ritter ’s comparison of solid and liquid 
matter is similar to Zhu Xi’s definition of mountains and rivers, and the comparison of 
dynamic and static matter is similar to the definition of animals and plants. Then, 
there is only a difference between “spaces” and “Di-Li.” Remembering “Di-Li” is 
generally translated as “geography,” we understand the importance of this 
correspondence and the prescience of Zhu Xi.  
Even so, you may think that it is a far-fetched view that we consider “day and night, 
up and down” as infinite, and “south and north, height and depth” as finite. On this 
point, Xiong He (熊禾), who commented on the “Yi Jing” interpretation in the Zhu-zi 
Xue, has already stated the same view by commenting on Zhu Xi’s definition as follows: 
“looking up to Jing-Wei (經緯), namely ‘Tian-Wen,’ which expands longitudinally and 
latitudinally, looking down to Yi-Ding (一定), namely ‘Di-Li,’ which expands to a limited 
extent”17) (熊 1995). The circulation of day and night, and the upper and lower ends of 
the universe are endless, or, at least, cannot be considered. On the contrary, “south and 
north, height and depth” have their own ends such as the South and North Poles, and 
the summits and the deeps. This cognitive difference is the reason why “Tian-Wen” is 
infinite and “Di-Li” is finite. Such a difference between the infinite and finite puzzled 
Zhu Xi from his infancy. He expressed his thoughts on this difference and on the 
impossibility of thinking of the infinite world in the following way: 
 
What is there outside of space? I have been confused by this problem since I was five 
or six years old. When I encountered the view that space is infinite, I thought it must 
have limits. The limits are just like a wall. There has to be something or other behind 
the wall. I was immersed in speculation almost sickly at that time. And still now, I 
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don’t know the world behind the wall 18).  
 
For him, a recognition of space or time is an indicator that divides their natures. Thus, 
“Tian-Wen” corresponds to Newton’s absolute space and time, while “Di-Li” rather 
corresponds to the so-called “lebensraum.” Especially, “Di-Li” defined as what is “finite” 
is an appropriate condition for “lebensraum,” which is “an experience of regions on the 
earth as the whole” (Hartshorne 1957: 318).  
 Besides this, “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” themselves are concepts that are acquired by 
cognizance if their natures are dependent on the recognition of their limits. These are 
shown by the character of You (有), meaning “having,” before each of the two phrases 
“day and night, up and down” and “south and north, height and depth.” According to 
Zhu Xi, “Tian-Wen” is not just “day and night, up and down,” and “Di-Li” is not just 
“south and north, height and depth”; they are what are “having” these features. 
Consequently, the above two phrases are understood as the space-time that is the inner 
phenomena in human cognizance19).  
 Zhu Xi’s definitions connote not only these meanings. He stated that “Tian-Wen,” 
“Di-Li,” and “Xing-Xiang” have the characters of the appearance of the principle. He 
said,  
 
The day is “Ming (明),” the night is “You (幽),” the up is “Ming,” and the down is 
“You.” Observing either the circulation of day and night or that there are 
heavenly bodies in the upper and lower parts of the universe, we understand 
the causes of “You-Ming” in “Tian-Wen.” The south is “Ming,” the north is “You,” 
the height is “Ming,” and the depth is “You.” Observing the limits of the earth’s 
surface, we understand the causes of “You-Ming” in “Di-Li” 20).  
 
His comments suggest that either “day and night, up and down” or “south and north, 
height and depth” are in contrast to “You-Ming.” Then, above infinite space and time, or 
the finite space called “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li,” reflects the principle that decides 
“You-Ming” in the world. Therefore, he answered the question “does the phrase ‘looking 
up to it and finding “Tian-Wen (天文),” looking down to it and finding “Di-Li”’ mean an 
observation by the ‘Yi (易)’ principle?” by answering: 
 
Yes, so the phrase “hence, the cause of ‘You-Ming’ follows them.” “You-Ming” is 
just “Ying-Yan Gang-Rou (陰陽剛柔).” It is only the “Ying-Yan” principle in spite 
of various explanations. The south is “Ming” and the north is “You.” If the sun 
rises, it is “Ming”; if the sun sets, it is “You.” By looking at both “Tian-Wen” and 
“Di-Li,” we know what the principle is 21).  
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We also understand that the contrast between “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li,” and all of their 
features, are in the “Yin-Yang” principle, from the following quotation.  
 
“Tian-Wen” is the Yang; “Di-Li” is the Yin. However, they have Yin and Yang in 
each of them. In the former, the day is Yang, the night is Yin; the sun is Yang, 
the moon is Yin. In the latter, the height is Yang, the depth is Yin; the flat is 
Yang, the steep is Yin; the southeast is Yang, the northwest is Yin, and so. 
“You-Ming” is just the “Yin-Yang” principle 22).  
 
Furthermore, this “Yin-Yang” controls “Xing-Xiang.” Dong Kai (董楷), who was a pupil 
of a pupil of Zhu Xi, said that,  
 
The changes don’t occur after “Xing-Xiang” as the cause; they don’t emerge like 
“Xing-Xiang.” Then, we can recognize a locus of changes through “Xing-Xiang.” 
The sun, the moon, or other stars belong to “Xiang”; mountains, rivers, animals, 
or plants belong to “Xing.” Then, “Xiang” is formed by Yang Qi (陽氣, which is 
translated as positive energy); “Xing” is formed by Yin Qi (陰氣, which is 
translated as negative energy). But, because there is Yin in the Yang, the sun 
and a kind of star is Yang, so that the moon and other half stars are Ying. 
Because there is Yang in the Yin too, mountains are Yin, so that rivers are Yang 
23) (董 1983).  
 
According to this, “Xing-Xiang” is phenomena that show the principle of the changes as 
their cause. Zhu Xi’s concepts of space-time and phenomena have the principle called 
“Yin-Yang” in common. 
 From the above, we can draw the following conclusion: Zhu-Xi’s concepts of “Tian-Wen” 
and “Di-Li” are infinite space-time and finite space that express the “Yin-Yang” 
principle, and are formed in the cognizance of observers. Zhu Xi combined the 
traditional “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” since the “Han Shu” with the concepts of “Yu-Zhou” 
or “Dao” in the “Huai-Nan-zi.” He redefined “Yu-Zhou,” which is absolute space-time as 
“Tian-Wen,” and separated “Di-Li,” which is “lebensraum,” from it by the standards of 
humans’ general limits of cognizance. In addition, he considered the phenomena within 
“Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” as other percepts, defined them as another concept of 
“Xing-Xiang,” and excluded the character as the integration of phenomena from the 
traditional interpretation of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” Finally, he concluded that they 
are recognized universally because they appear as the “Yin-Yang” principle. We 
assume that there is the logic such as that of Kant, who internalized Newton’s absolute 
space as the a priori form of sense behind his consideration24). The concepts of 
“Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li,” which were defined very briefly by Zhu Xi, preceded Kant’s 
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concept of space by hundreds of years. It is, however, just one aspect of the Zhu-xi Xue 
space-time theory. In order to grasp the full meaning of the concepts, we have to 
examine the substance of space-time called “Tian-Di” and “Ren.” 
 
2. “Tian-Di” and “Ren” —the substance of space-time— 
 
a. “Tian-Di” as the substance  
It is assumed that there is a substance in our cognition as an object of cognition 
because “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” are formed by cognition. As quoted above, there must 
be the entity of the world deep in “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” Of course, we can express it 
in general words such as “world,” “universe,” “earth,” and so. In fact, these general 
concepts are the first subjects of traditional geography; there are hardly discussions 
about their consistency because it is considered as self-evident, so that these words are 
often attacked because of their ambiguous definitions. As seen in chapter II, important 
concepts in traditional geography, such as “region,” “environment/milieu,” and 
“landschaft,” mean “space as units” (Hartshorne 1975: 193-194), and were devised to 
research the ultimate and too general substance almost equal to all things. Then, the 
reason why these “actual” concepts of space were abandoned and the “morphological” or 
“geometric” spaces were abstracted from them was that the consistency of the 
phenomena as their “material” and conceptual consistency of “the earth” as the entirety 
of these phenomena were uncertain. Therefore, in order to maintain their conceptual 
independence and the consistency of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” with “Xing-Xiang,” it is 
necessary to define their substance strictly. How did Zhu Xi clarify the definition of the 
substance of space, namely “the earth” or “the world,” as the ultimate subject of 
geography? 
 In China and East Asia, this kind of concept was called “Tian-Di (天地)” traditionally; 
and Zhu Xi used this name for his concept of “the world.” This word “Tian-Di” means 
the heaven (天) and the earth (地). Zhu Xi, however, was not content with such an old 
and simple definition. He considered “Tian-Di” as the “substance of Yin-Yang Xing-Qi 
(陰陽形氣)” 25). Moreover, he abstracted their core attributes and called them “Qian-Kun 
(乾坤)” to clarify the relation between “Tian-Di” and other beings, especially “Qi.” This 
analysis made him able to unify the world strictly as one reasonable concept. The 
following is Zhu Xi’s interpretation of “Tian-Di.” 
 As in the discussion about the concept of “Tian-Di,” we should pay attention to the 
various meanings of this traditional word; we will deal with only “Tian-Di” as the 
entire of world but other concepts. In Chinese philosophy, “Tian-Di” or the word “Tian” 
connotes various meanings, not only “heaven and the earth” or “the (physical) world” 
but also God, fate, nature, and virtue (Yamane 1983: 186). However, Zhu Xi, who was a 
kind of atheist, denied God and such characters of “Tian-Di,” so that he answered the 
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question “is there God above in the heaven?” by saying “the ‘Li (理)’ (the ultimate and 
metaphysical principle of laws) controls all things” 26). However, the word “Tian” was 
polysemous for him; he regarded that there is the “Tian” as the God by the context27). 
Thus, although “Tian-Di,” or “Tian,” was not given a simple meaning, it was not 
confusing. We should mention only “Tian-Di” as the substance of “Tian-Wen” and 
“Di-Li.” When we say “Tian,” it must be paired with “Di.” It is separated from other 
“Tian” or “Di” as the substantial concept that says “the ‘Tian’ is one huge material” 28). 
For details of other meanings, see also Yamane (1983) and Yamada (1978). 
 As quoted earlier, Zhu Xi defined “Tian-Di” as the “substance of Yin-Yang Xing-Qi,” in 
short, the substance of the general physical beings and Yin-Yang beings. We can also 
see in the same statement that “‘Tian-Di’ is the entity that unifies the only one huge 
Yin-Yang” in the “Zhu-zi Yu-Lei” 29). Thus, it is understood that “Tian-Di” connotes the 
concept of “Yin-Yang.” But what is “Yin-Yang?” Indeed, this concept is one of the most 
abstruse words in Chinese philosophy. Therefore, we must also discuss what this 
concept is. 
“Yin-Yang” is known as the basis of the “Yi Jing” system. This paper deals with Zhu 
Xi’s concepts seen in his commentaries of “Yi Jing”; the body of “Yi Jing” is binary 
symbols called “Gua (卦),” which consist of a sign called “Yao (爻),” either broken lines 
as “Yin” or full lines as “Yang.” This “Gua” has two styles: eight types of “Gua,” which 
consist of the triplicates of “Yao”: as Qian (乾)☰, Dui (兌)☱, Li (離)☲, Zhen (震)☳, Xun 
(巽)☴, Kan (坎)☵, Gen (艮)☶, and Kun (坤)☷; and sixty-four types of “Gua,” which are 
constructed by further double eight types. Zhu Xi considered that these “Gua” and “Yao” 
are produced from the “substance of Yin-Yang” as “Tian-Di” itself30). He emphasized the 
combination between “Yi Jing” and “Yin-Yang.” As he said that “a character of ‘Yi (易)’ 
means only Yin-Yang” 31), “Yi (易)” can only be expressed in one word: “Yin-Yang” 32), and 
that “Yi is just this Yin-Yang” 33), his conviction was strong. But what does this 
“Yin-Yang,” which is regarded as the principle, mean in actuality? Why can it be 
considered as the basis of “Yi?”  
“Yin-Yang” is the radical nominalism that there is a difference in every moment and 
being. Zhu Xi said, “there has never been a non-Yin-Yang being. Just as motion and 
stillness, pronunciation and silence, these differences are the Yin-Yang principle itself. 
Suppose there is a fan. If someone uses it and fans something, it is Yang. Then, if he 
stops to use it, it is Yin. There is nothing that doesn’t have the principle” 34). All 
differences among not only matter but also moments in the same matter, such as atoms 
or ideas, are Yin and Yang. According to this principle, all identities are denied. There 
is a material called “water.” However, there is no water but water molecules; they are 
separated as Yin and Yang. Then, the molecules consist of oxygen atoms and hydrogen 
atoms; they are also separated. The atom consists of an electron and a nucleus, and the 
nucleus further connotes a proton and a neutron; they are also Yin and Yang. Moreover, 
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the proton and the neutron consist of three quarks. The quark, which is considered one 
of the smallest forms of matter, also consists of its past and its future. All beings 
continue as differential; this differential is “Yin-Yang.” It is unceasing opposition35). 
 This “Yin-Yang,” however, is also the basis of the theory of the creation of the universe 
in “Tai-Ji Tu-Shuo.” We find that the word “Tai-Ji” is the metaphysical Dao and 
Yin-Yang is the physical “Qi (器)”36) in the “Tai-Ji Tu-Shuo Jie (太極圖説解)” as noted in 
Zhu Xi’s commentary of this book (湖 1981). This obviously means “Yin-Yang” are 
material and physical beings37), so that this interpretation considers “Yin-Yang” as a 
kind of gas-like material (Yasuda 1976). This may be an extreme instance, but there is 
also no doubt that “Yin-Yang” is connoted by “Qi,” which means general physical beings. 
Zhu Xi stated, “All things are Yin-Yang. There is no non-Yin-Yang things” 38), and 
suggested “‘Yin-Yang’ is just the one Qi. A decline of Yang is an increase of Yin. It is just 
a misunderstanding that one Yang Qi declines and the other Yin generates”39); the 
“Yin-Yang” is the perfect whole of physical beings. We can read from his thought that 
everything is based on the opposition of “Yin-Yang,” which is principle to accomplishing 
the “Qi” monism. Contrary to the above “Yin-Yang” principle, this is the logic that 
restores all things to oneness. The differences among matter are naturally dissolved 
under this logic. The difference in “Yin-Yang” is only a decline and an increase, and 
proves all different things are originally one. Nominalistic differences do not become a 
reality until there are relative beings. They must be relative. Therefore, these 
differences are dependent on other beings. “Yin” does not become “Yin” itself without 
“Yang.” It is the same with “Yang.” Consequently, it is concluded that their difference is 
an aspect of the monistic material called “Yi Qi,” which means physical oneness. Zhu Xi 
found the realistic substance in the final nominalism.  
 “Tian-Di” is hidden behind this theory of materials. As quoted previously, “‘Tian-Di’ is 
the entity that unifies the only one huge Yin-Yang.” It is the substance that unifies the 
huge Yin-Yang as the mass of miscellaneous matters. “Tian-Di” assimilates various 
matters separated as “Yin” or “Yang” into the one world because of infinite differences. 
It is just the “substance of Yin-Yang Xing-Qi.” However, it is not a complex concept 
mixed with various and disordered phenomena like the concept of “world” or “earth.” 
Because there is nothing that can be unified, it is rather unity that is forced to be the 
whole. 
 Even so, why is “Tian-Di,” which is equal to the whole world as the unifier of 
“Yin-Yang,” considered as a radical nominalistic principle? This is because “Tian-Di” 
consists of the essences of “Yin-Yang.” These essences are called “Qian-Kun (乾坤),” 
which also means pure Yin-Yang “Gua.” It is understood that this concept is 
inseparable from “Tian-Di” by considering Zhu Xi’s statement that “‘Qian-Kun’ is its 
mind and emotional side, and ‘Tian-Di’ is its shell. In fact, they are one principle.” This 
can also be understood by considering his pupil’s statement complementing this, 
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“‘Tian-Di’ is the physical being. ‘Tian-Di’ is the shell of ‘Qian-Kun,’ and ‘Qian-Kun’ is the 
mental and emotional side of ‘Tian-Di’” 40). Then, Zhu Xi defined “Qian-Kun” by saying 
“‘Qian’ is robustness and strength: the essence of Yang,” and “the essence of Yang is 
robustness and strength, and its greatest embodiment is Tian” 41); he also says “‘Kun’ is 
obedience: the essence of Yin,” and that “there is nothing in the embodiment of Yin as 
great as ‘Di’” 42). However, their meanings have not yet been ascertained. The 
expressions “robustness and strength” and “obedience” are based on the text of “Yi 
Jing,” so it is not Zhu Xi’s original interpretation. His theory is rather influenced by 
Zhang Zai and is known as a precursor of Leibniz’s concept of space. In his writings 
“San-Liang” in the chapter “Zheng-Meng” (湖 1981), about “the essence of Yang” and 
“the essence of Yin” as the definition of “Qian-Kun” he said, “the essence of Yin is the 
action of condensation. The essence of Yang is the action of diffusion. Whenever Yin 
condenses something, Yang always diffuses it” 43). He regarded the essence of “Yin-Yang” 
as the inherent attraction and repulsion of materials. Zhu Xi also commented that 
“Zhang Zai saying that ‘whenever the Yin condenses something, the Yang always 
diffuses it’ rather clarified the essence of ‘Yin-Yang’” 44). The “Qian-Kun,” therefore, is 
the action of condensation and diffusion. It is the same as the action that creates space 
and materials; “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” as space and “Xing-Xiang” as materials are 
formed by the condensation and diffusion of “Yin-Yang” as “Yi Qi.” Thus, Zhu Xi said 
that “there is the only one ‘Yin-Yang’…there is nothing called ‘Yin-Yang.’ For example, 
front is Yang, rear is Yin; left is Yang, right is Yin; the upper side is Yang, the lower side 
is Yin”45) or there was only the Qi of “Yin-Yang” at the time when the world begun. This 
sole physical material, the so-called “Qi,” moved and collided with itself, collided more 
violently, and finally generated a lot of dust of the matter. And this dust had nowhere to 
go; as a result, it condensed at the center of world as “Di.” By contrast, the rest of the 
“Qi,” which was clean, diffused and became the “Tian” or the heavenly bodies. They 
were on the outer edges of the world, and revolved around “Di”46). The former quotation 
explained the process of the formation of space; the latter explained the process of the 
formation of materials. 
 Besides this, the “Qian-Kun” is related to time. There is a sentence that “Qian knows 
the great beginning, Kun perfects materials (乾知大始，坤作成物)” in “Yi Jing”; Zhu Xi 
commented on this sentence, saying, “the word ‘know (知)’ means what rules (主). ‘Qian’ 
rules the beginning of matter, and ‘Kun’ perfects it,” and added, “Generally, Yang 
precedes Yin. Yang gives it and Ying receives it. The light and cleanliness of Yang is 
still formed, and the weight and cloudiness of Yin is already formed” 47). This is not all. 
He also said that “the word ‘know (知)’ means what conducts. ‘Qian’ conducts the great 
beginning. The great beginning is the beginning of materials. ‘Qian’ creates the 
materials, and ‘Kun’ perfects this process” 48). These mentioned the determination of 
the future of matter by “Qian-Kun.” It is an action that controls time, as opposed to 
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condensation and diffusion as the cause of space. It should be considered, however, as a 
variety of condensation and diffusion. The great beginning by “Qian” is the appearance 
of materials by the essence of Yang. It is caused by diffusion from the primary oneness 
called “Yi Qi.” Then, the perfection by “Kun” is the process through which the essence 
of Yin creates various matter by the condensation of “Yi Qi,” which was diffused and 
rarefied into the formless. Zhu Xi’s concept of time is such circulations that repeat over 
the generations and the perfection of material beings; after all, it is the condensation 
and the diffusion of “Yin-Yang.” 
 The following words of Zhu Xi summarized the action of “Tian-Di” and “Qian-Kun” at 
their essence. He said, although “Yin-Yang” consists of two words, it is a movement of 
“Yi Qi”: ebb and flow, or vanishing and emergence of “Yi Qi.” Where it flows is the Yang, 
where it ebbs is the Yin; where it emerges is the Yang, where it vanishes is the Yin. It 
means just that the movement of “Yi Qi” creates all things in the expanse of the space 
and time 49). He considered that either space or time, or the materials or whatever, are 
generated by the condensation and diffusion of “Yi Qi.” He also expressed that 
“Yin-Yang” creates these by the dynamic and static forms, in the following statement 
about “Tai-Ji Tu-Shuo.” He said, 
 
One of the “Yin-Yang” is dynamic; the other is static. The words of the “Tai-Ji Tu-Shuo,” 
“once moves, once stops; and they become the basis of each other,” represent the 
dynamic aspect, which is time such as the seasons. The words of the same book, 
“separated as Yin, as Yang, two types are fixed,” represent the static, which is space 
such as the upside and downside and the four quarters 50).  
 
Or, the words quoted above actually have the same meanings as “the concept of 
‘Dong-Jing (動靜),’ as the dynamic and the static are just like ‘day and night,’ and the 
concept of ‘Ying-Yan’ is just like the expanse of north, south, east, and west. Then, the 
words (in ‘Tai-Ji Tu-Shuo’) ‘once move, once stop’ concern time, and the words 
‘separated as Ying, as Yan’ concern location” 51). Thus, “Yin-Yang” as “Yi Qi” is unified 
by “Tian-Di,” which has the essence called “Qian-Kun.” “Yin-Yang” are different from 
each other, so that they repeat an ebb and flow. However, this movement naturally 
forms space and time, and they are united as the one world called “Tian-Di.” Thus, it 
was considered that “all matter has a part of the ‘Qian-Kun.’ It must be in even the 
smallest places, the most invisible points like the tip of a hair, or wherever” 52) and that 
“Tian-Di” as the whole world solves the opposition of “Yin-Yang” among the minutest 
matter through the actions of “Qian-Kun.” Therefore, the scale of “Tian-Di” is elastic, as 
stated that “‘Tian-Di’ is the hugest matter of all and the matter of all is the minutest 
‘Tian-Di’”53). It is the world formed by the condensation and diffusion of “Yin-Yang.” 
“Yin-Yang” must create space and time, so that it is just one “Tian-Di” regardless of its 
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scale; even if the whole universe, or “Di-Li,” which is the finite space of all people’s 
limited cognitions, a sphere of one person’s cognizance, “space as a unit,” a field of 
vision at the moment, a microcosm in an atomic nucleus, or whatever else, they are one 
independent “Tian-Di” as the whole54). 
 This logic shows that “Tian-Di” is the substance of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” As stated 
above, “Tian-Di” is the body of action of the formation of space and time by “Yin-Yang.” 
Thus, it is proper that the “Yin-Yang” principle appears in “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” as a 
kind of space and time. The division between the infinite “Tian-Wen” and the finite 
“Di-Li” by its observability is practicable because of the nature of “Tian-Di,” which 
unifies all things regardless of scale. Thus, the concepts of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” can 
be explained by the logic introduced in this chapter. However, these are still inadequate 
for confirming that “Tian-Di” is the substance of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” Why is the 
division of these two concepts based on human cognition? Of course, there is no 
contradiction. “Di-Li,” which separated from “Tian-Wen,” is consistently united as one 
concept. The question is what is the reason such a division was created. 
 
b. “Ren” as the logic 
 At a glance, it is incomprehensible that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” must be formed by the 
human cognition as an uncertain condition. This argument was, however, not 
particularly surprising in works of Chinese philosophy like the Zhu-zi Xue because of 
the traditional thought of “San-Cai (三才),” which means the incorporation of “Tian-Di” 
as the world and “Ren (人)” as mankind as its basis. 
 The thought of “San-Cai,” that there are “three functions of the world,” “Tian 
(heaven),” “Di (earth),” and “Ren (mankind),” is perhaps very old. It might have been a 
kind of naive religious concept that opposed mankind to “Tian-Di” as God as the ruler 
of the universe; “Ren” originally meant mankind itself in ancient times so that “Tian-Di” 
was the sky and the earth. However, the “Yi Jing” already said, “‘Yi’ as the book is 
immeasurable and provides all things; it has ‘Tian Dao,’ ‘Di Dao,’ and ‘Ren Dao,’ which 
are the principle of ‘Tian-Di’ and ‘Ren’ (易之爲書也，廣大悉備．有天道焉，有人道焉，有
地道焉).” Therein, the “San-Cai” was considered as a sort of philosophical concept such 
as “Dao,” so that it had lost its literal meaning. It is the human or psychological 
principle that is an abstracted concept of mankind itself, and accompanies “Tian-Di” as 
the physical principle that unifies space, time, and materials. Then, Zhu Xi succeeded 
this interpretation of the “Ren” in the “Yi Jing.” He said that “the laws of both ‘Qian’ 
and ‘Kun’ appear in ‘Tian-Di’ as separate, but ‘Ren’ possesses both laws” 55), or “‘San-Ji 
(三極),’ as meaning ‘three extremes,’ is the extreme principle of ‘Tian,’ ‘Di,’ and ‘Ren.’ 
Each of the ‘San-Cai’ is, in fact, the ‘Tai-Ji’” 56). But why does “Ren” possess both the 
laws of “Qian” and “Kun?” Is “Ren,” namely mere mankind, the “Tai-Ji” that rules the 
condensation and diffusion of the universe? 
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 Zhu Xi approved of such an absurdity that human beings rule universal law; he 
understood this word “Ren” not as mankind but as the cause of law and order. And this 
is not original to him but is traditional. We can see that “the ‘Sheng-Ren (聖人)’ as the 
sage controls ‘Tian-Di’ and all matter (天地萬物，聖人裁之)” in the “Shi-zi,” and that, 
“inevitably, ‘Tian’ creates everything, and ‘Di’ perfects it57). However, they cannot rule it. 
Then, a monarch rules ‘Ren’ and accomplishes the functions of ‘Tian’ and ‘Di.’ So, he is 
called as a monarch. If not, how does ‘Tian-Di’ fulfill its nature?” 58) in the commentary 
on the “Yi Jing” by Si-Ma Guang (司馬 1983), who is known as the author of the famous 
chronicle “Zi-Zhi Tong-Jian (資治通鑑).” These words mean that “Ren” is a sort of 
controller of “Tian-Di.” By these, we know that “Ren,” which is not obedient to “Tian-Di,” 
is as huge as the universe. “Ren,” indeed, is regarded in traditional interpretations as 
the ruler that reigns but not creates anything.  
 Zhu Xi’s concept of “Ren” is shown in his commentary on a sentence of the “Yi Jing”: 
“limiting the creation of ‘Tian-Di’ and having no excess, forming the details of the 
universe and having no rest, sinking into the law of day and having no night to know. 
Hence, ‘Shen (神)’ as the divinity is omnipresent because of no direction and ‘Yi (易)’ is 
incorporeal”59). He commented that “the creation by ‘Tian-Di’ is infinite. The sage 
(Sheng-Ren) makes a model of it and would not let it stray from the middle way” 60). 
Thus, he thought that it was necessary for the sage that “Tian-Di” creates everything 
in order (he considered “Shen-Ren” as the sage is “Ren” itself 61)). Here, we know that 
“Ren” is the principle that causes law and order. Furthermore, we can see by his more 
detailed comments in the “Zhu-zi Yu Lei” that  
 
The creation of “Tian-Di” is infinitely torrential, and it never stops melting such 
as metal in a furnace. Then, Shen-Ren becomes a mold—that to say, “Ren” 
becomes a model of the creation of “Tian-Di”—and leads it to stray from the 
middle way. The next words “forming details of the universe and having no rest” 
concern the quantity and quality of matter. “Ren” determines the inherent 
nature of each matter with its ideal length, size, extent, and shape, so that 
there is no omission in its action that is the causes law and order. The words 
“limiting the creation of ‘Tian-Di’” mean the maximum of its actions, and 
“forming details of the universe” means the minimum 62).  
 
According to this, “Ren” gives “Wu-Li (物理),” namely the inherent nature of matter to 
all things from “Tian-Di” as the whole to its creation. If it had not given the inherent 
nature to them, they would be “Rong Hua Bu Xi (鎔化不息),” that is, they would not 
receive its nature or any form; after all, they would have remained in formless chaos. 
Therefore, he answers the question “Will ‘Tian-Di’ collapse?” with “it must not collapse” 
and “however, if the principle of ‘Ren’ was about to be annihilated, all things would fuse 
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into one, simultaneously, in that moment and become simple chaos itself, so that 
whether a man or matter, they would become extinct, and finally a new world would be 
born” 63). If the cause of law and order vanished, “Tian-Di” would lose control of its 
infinite creative power and return to the chaos of the beginning while swallowing up 
the universe. That kind of incident would be impossible, to be sure, because both “Ren” 
and “Tian-Di” are fundamental beings of reality. Zhu Xi denied the above question for 
this reason. Hence, it is understood that “Ren” according to the concept in the Zhu-zi 
Xue is the principle that inheres all things as the creation of “Tian-Di,” from the whole 
world to the minutest matter, and gives the nature as law and order to them. 
 Such inherence of “Ren” is also mentioned in Zhu Xi’s complement to his comment 
that “‘Shen (神)’ as the divinity is omnipresent because of no direction and that ‘Yi (易)’ 
is incorporeal.” He said, 
 
This “direction” (the original Chinese word is “Fang 方”) means the expanse of 
the upside, downside, and four quarters. The divinity of “Ren” is here or there 
or wherever; it lies in the whole of space. So, it is said “no direction.” And then, 
“‘Yi (易)’ is incorporeal” means that sometimes it is changed into Yang from Yin, 
sometimes it is changed into Yin from Yang, so that its condition is not 
confirmed. So, it is said it is “incorporeal”…and that “Yi” is the change. The 
Yin-Yang is not unchangeable even for a day or for a minute (therefore it lies in 
the whole of time) 64).  
 
He also emphasized that the action of “Ren” extends to the whole of space-time. “Ren” 
as the universal principle is immanent in “Tian-Di” as the substance of space-time.  
 But why does this principle have such an action, and is called “Ren,” the Chinese word 
meaning “mankind?” It seems that there are no human features in the character of this 
concept as the principle. However, it should be named “Ren.” There is a human feature, 
so that the law and order that rescue “Tian-Di” from chaos can receive the basis of their 
identity. The reason is shown in Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the statement “being similar 
to the ‘Tian-Di,’ hence no difference; knowing the universe extensively and ruling the 
world, hence no excess” 65) in the “Yi Jing.” He commented on it as follows.  
 
This sentence describes the perfection of “Xing (性),” which is the nature of 
matter connoting the metaphysical principle by “Sheng-Ren.” “Dao” as a 
principle of “Tian-Di” is both “Zhi (知)” as a kind of knowledge and “Ren (仁)” as 
a kind of benevolence. “Tian” knows the universe extensively, and “Di” leads 
and forms the world; the former is done by “Zhi,” the latter is done by “Ren (仁).” 
Then, all things can be recognized and maintain their neutrality by the 
coexistence of “Zhi” and “Ren (仁)” 66).  
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He considered this as describing that “Sheng-Ren,” who is the embodiment of the “Ren 
(人)” principle, accomplishes the principle of “Tian-Di” through “Zhi” and “Ren (仁).” 
“Zhi” is an aspect of the principle of “Tian,” which knows the universe; “Ren (仁)” is an 
aspect of the principle of “Di,” which forms the world. If so, it seems that “Ren (人)” 
gives law and order to “Tian-Di” through these two. However, this remains unclear in 
the meanings of “Zhi” and “Ren (仁).” Then, we see in the other part of the “Yi Jing” 
that “a man who has ‘Ren (仁)’ as benevolence sees it and says ‘it is benevolence; a man 
who has “Zhi” as knowledge sees it and says ‘it is knowledge;’ other people use it day to 
day and don’t know it” 67). Zhu Xi commented that “‘Ren (仁)’ is Yang and ‘Zhi’ is Yin; 
they embody a part of the fundamental principle. Therefore, the man who has ‘Zhi’ or 
‘Ren (仁)’ regards a part of the principle as the whole in his cognizance” 68). According to 
him, it is understood that “Zhi” and “Ren (仁)” are kinds of cognition. So is “Zhi” the 
cognition of Yin? Is “Ren (仁)” the cognition of Yang? The reason we cannot answer “yes” 
to these questions is expressed by Zhu Xi’s comment:  
 
In the preceding chapter, “Zhi” belongs to “Tian” as the substance of Yang, and 
“Ren (仁)” belongs to “Di” as the substance of Yin; it resists description in this 
chapter. Why? It is because they are classified by the purity and impurity of 
objects of cognition in the preceding chapter; this is in contrast to this chapter, 
classifying them by the dynamic and the static 69).  
 
Hence, these two are the cognitions concerned with both Yin and Yang. Zhu Xi also 
commented on “purity and impurity,” saying, “‘Zhi’ is the primal cognition of the 
obvious and empty things, so that it belongs to ‘Tian.’ The phrase ‘ruling the world’ 
means what perfects the universe, and that its actual effects relate to all people, so that 
it belongs to ‘Di’” 70). Although it is a little difficult, we will explain the gist of his words. 
Generally, a vivid impression precedes other concrete sensations in the early stage of 
perception. Zhu Xi defined it as “Zhi,” which is a form of cognition and belongs to “Tian” 
because of its purity, which is as diffusible as Yang. In opposition to this, after the 
perfection of the concrete sensation of substantial matter, our cognition can be 
communicated and shared by all people. This cognition is called “Ren (仁)” because it is 
obtained regardless of oneself and others, and is dealt with as the impure because it 
supposes the concrete sensation as a condensed impression. Thus, it belongs to “Di” as 
it is condensable, as Yin. In short, the beginning and perfection of the action of 
cognition are both the “purity and impurity” of “Zhi” and “Ren (仁).” On the other hand, 
he commented about the “the dynamic and the static” as follows. 
 
This classification states that everything has the nature as its fundamental 
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principle, whereas each “Qi” of everything is different from each other, so that 
we recognize something by the similarities to their actual natures; a man who 
has “Ren (仁)” as benevolence will recognize only the appearances and flow of 
matter, and judge them as “Ren (仁)”; a man who has “Zhi” as knowledge will 
recognize only stability and silence, and judge them as “Zhi” 71).  
 
Here, he interpreted “Ren (仁)” as the cognition of matter that is diffused by Yang, 
namely “the dynamic,” and “Zhi” as another cognition of a matter that is condensed by 
Yin, namely “the static.” Thus, as above, both “Zhi” and “Ren (仁)” are concepts that 
classify the cognition of everything as either sequences of its action, called “purity and 
impurity,” or modes of it as the object of cognition called “the dynamic and the static.” 
And, the former is a definition of its object of cognition as a temporal order, and the 
latter a definition of its object of cognition as a spatial order. What do they mean? After 
all, they are concepts of logic. There must be logic in our cognition. A halberd that 
pierces whatever is there and a shield that is never pierced must not coexist in our 
cognizance because there is logic (or Logos) as an order which a form of sequences and 
modes.  
“Zhi” and “Ren (仁)” are principles of “Tian-Di,” which is displayed by “Ren (人).” They 
are considered as the action that gives law and order to all beings through human 
cognition. Hence, this action of cognition, which is the principle called “Ren (人),” limits 
the creation of “Tian-Di”; it gives the logic to “Tian-Di.” 
 In this way, we can understand Zhu Xi’s interpretation that “Ren” gives law and order 
as logic to “Tian-Di” as the substance of space, time, and the universe; he regarded all 
law and order as merely our cognition, even strict physical laws like the law of gravity, 
or universal mathematical laws like the Pythagorean Theorem. Gravity no doubt exists, 
to be sure, but the law of gravity exists only in our cognition. These laws will emerge in 
our brains as simple relations, that is to say, as pure logic. The same is true of 
geographical laws, which sometimes include many exceptions. A kind of law, the 
so-called “rank-size rule,” is preferred by quantitativists and is the coinage of their 
cognition. A concept of essential region, of course the formal region too, also can exist 
after we recognize some of the features and judge that these features are alike in 
something or other. However, we do not attach importance to the subjective. There is 
law and order as logic; it will appear in human cognition objectively. If no one 
recognizes it, there would complete chaos or disorder without logic. 
 Zhu Xi believed, therefore, that the incognizable world would be in chaos because 
there is no “Ren (人)” as logic. As mentioned above, he expected the collapse of “Tian-Di” 
to result from a lack of “Ren (人),” and compared the limit of space to a wall because 
there is law and order in the cognizable fields. Then there is the illogical and 
unknowable world beyond the cognizable fields, as Kant’s “the thing in itself,” as Zhu 
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Xi said “and still now, I don’t know the world behind the wall.” The basis of the division 
between “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” is born under this thought. They are divided by the 
possibility of cognition, namely, the presence or absence of “Ren (人).” 
 However, the action of “Ren (人 )” is essentially infinite as we mentioned; it is 
considered to give law and order to the whole “Tian-Di.” Despite this, the reason why 
there will be a division of “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” is that each person cannot accomplish 
the action of “Ren (人)” as “Sheng-Ren” 72). Then, the unknowable world is separated 
from the real world as the cognizable. Zhu Xi sighed over his ignorance about the world 
beyond the wall, to be sure, but he never wanted to climb over the wall. The closer a 
person comes to “Sheng-Ren” as an ideal embodiment of the principle of “Ren (人),” the 
greater the wall becomes. In consequence, this wall will ultimately enclose the whole 
world; this is also an almost impossible correspondence between the infinite “Tian-Wen” 
and the finite “Di-Li.” He sighed, indeed, not because of his ignorance but because of 
the fact that there is something of matter beyond the wall. He had attempted to unify 
the limit of “Di-Li” with the expanse of “Tian-Wen” or the whole of “Tian-Di.” This is 
shown by his statement “there is ‘limiting the creation of the “Tian-Di” and no excess,’ 
but there is either the greater limit or the smaller. Then, I know that one matter has its 
limit by considering my body” 73). “Ren” as the principle of cognition gives law and order 
to everything individually; ideally, it acts to an infinite expanse; actually, it acts to the 
limits of all people’s cognitions. Then, they are separated from the incognizable chaos 
as the finite worlds. This is the reason why “Tian-Di” will become a world regardless of 
scale. 
 The above is an outline of the concept of “Ren (人),” which is a part of the “San-Cai.” It 
is the principle that gives law and order to all beings and is the basis of the division 
between “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” However, the “Ren (人)” of the Zhu Xi supposes 
“Yin-Yang” is a radical nominalistic principle. It is the principle that denies any 
correspondences. If we analyze a something fact strictly, they must differ from each 
other. With such a comprehension, law and order, which is explained by some 
correspondences and differences among matter, will sink into vanity. Zhu Xi, therefore, 
considered all of them as the coinage of human cognition, to be sure, but he was not an 
idealistic fanatic. He devoted himself to pursuing the absolute providence, called 
principle, law, or order, which never has any exceptions. Furthermore, he regarded the 
“Yi-Yin Yi-Yang (一陰一陽)” as this providence itself. The concepts we mentioned above, 
which are named “Tian-Wen,” “Di-Li,” “Tian-Di,” “Ren,” “Yin-Yang,” and others, are 
based on this radical principle. It is the ultimate principle and the firm philosophical 
basis at the center of the innermost concept of space in the Zhu-zi Xue. 
 
3. “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” ―the metaphysical principle– 
 Not only the name but also the philosophical definition of “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang (一陰一
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陽)”—this word is seen in the “Yi Jing”—is not known. At least, it is generally referred 
to in East Asia as “Tian-Di,” “Tian-Wen,” or “Di-Li.” In addition, its difference from the 
“Yin-Yang” is hardly understood. If there are some differences, then is it merely a form 
of “Yin-Yang?” Almost no Confucians, however, thought such. Especially, Zhu Xi 
regarded it as the very important principle at the center of creation. In this chapter, we 
clarify the meaning of this concept through analyzing chapter V of “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan 
(繋辭上傳)” in the “Yi Jing.” 
 It is said that “‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang’ is called ‘Dao’”74) at the beginning of chapter V in “Ji-Ci 
Shang Zhuan.” Zhu Xi commented that “Chains of interactions of ‘Yin-Yang’ are ‘Qi’ as 
physical facts. On the other hand, ‘Li (理)’ as the principle is this ‘Dao’” 75). He defined 
“Dao,” which is the name of “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang,” as the principle of “Yin-Yang” as the 
physical material, so that these two concepts are divided. His interpretation, in fact, 
succeeded the traditional commentary, especially that of Cheng Yi (程頤). Imai (1958) 
surveyed the detailed process of its meaning. He said that “Cheng Yi made the sharpest 
distinction between ‘Yin-Yang’ and ‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang,’ and Zhu Xi succeeded his 
comprehension,” so that Zhu Xi “divided ‘Yin-Yang’ and ‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang’ by determining 
whether they are metaphysical or not” (Imai 1958: 416). In brief, “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” is the 
metaphysical basis of “Yin-Yang” as a physical concept that consists of the features of 
“Tian-Di” or “Ren.” Besides this, Zhu Xi commented, “this ‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang’ is the cause 
of circulation, namely ‘Dao’” 76), and “‘Yin-Yang’ is not ‘Dao.’ One Yin emerges, 
whereupon one Yang follows; this is ‘Dao’” 77). According to him, “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” is the 
cause of the circulation of “Yin-Yang.” Then, this circulation of “Yin-Yang” means the 
principle as the radical nominalism, as mentioned above. “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” causes the 
nominalistic situations as chains of illimitable differences. Hence, he also commented 
that “‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang’ is the principle of ‘Tian-Di’…this sentence (in the ‘Yi Jing’) 
explains the creation by ‘Tian-Di’ but not human nature”78), and shows that this 
principle became the beginning of the creation. 
 The following sentence he was referring to in the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” is “that which 
inherits it is called the good. That which forms it is called the nature” 79). His saying 
that “but human nature” concerned here. Then, he also commented,  
 
 “Dao” is immanent in Yin and actualized in Yang; the word “inherit” means the 
revelation of “Dao,” and “the good” is the result of creation and growth by this 
revelation. This explains what is related to Yang. On the other hand, the word 
“form” is what “Dao” becomes immanently, and “the nature” is what the matter 
acquires. Each matter attains its nature when it is created, whereupon they get 
“Dao” itself. This part explains what is related to Yin 80).  
 
The word “Dao,” of course, refers to “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang.” Thus, he also said, “the result of 
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the circulation and the creation is ‘the good,’ while what condenses in everything itself 
is ‘the nature.’ ‘Inherit’ explains the continuity of ‘the good’ and ‘form’ explains that 
there is a cause of the nature, condensation” 81). Consequently, “Dao” as “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” 
controls the diffusion and condensation of “Yin-Yang.” It is a chain reaction of all the 
matter. Then, “the nature” in the sentence is, as we quoted, not about the nature of all 
mankind but about the nature of all things. The “Yi Ching” mentions the nature of 
mankind in the following sentence of the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan”: “A man who has ‘Ren 
(仁)’ as benevolence sees it and says ‘it is benevolence; a man who has ‘Zhi’ as 
knowledge sees it and says ‘it is knowledge,’” 82） as quoted above. We will not describe 
its contents again owing to the limitations of space, but it is clear that ‘Yi-Yin Yi-Yang’ 
is behind the nature of mankind, in looking at Zhu Xi’s commentary on this. He 
considered that chapter V of the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” shows that “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” as 
the fundamental principle constructs the system of the principle of “Yin-Yang” and is 
the basis of “Tian-Di” and “Ren.” Moreover, he proved that “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” is the root 
of space-time through the forceful comments on the rest of this book. 
 The “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” follows further that “revealing it to “Ren (仁),” taking in it in 
“Yong (用),” beating the universe but being concerned in. “Shen-Ren” empathizes with. 
How complete the impressive virtues and the great enterprises are”83). Then, Zhu Xi 
interpreted it as follows.  
 
 What “reveals it” is a kind of action from an interior to an exterior. “Ren” in the 
sentence is such an action of expanding creation to an exterior, so that it is a 
manifestation of the “impressive virtue.” Contrariwise, what “takes it in” is a 
kind of action from an exterior to an interior. “Yong” in the sentence is such an 
action of secret and confined force, so that it is a manifestation of the “great 
enterprise.” So, Master Cheng (Cheng Hao) said “‘Tian-Di’ has no heart and 
creates the universe; ‘Shen-Ren’ has a heart but does nothing”84),  
 
He goes on to say, “the fact is, the two phrases ‘revealing it to “Ren (仁),” taking it in 
‘Yong (用)”’ is one thing; the former means the cognizable such as “that which inherits it 
is called the good” in the preceding sentence, the latter means the uncognizable such as 
“that which forms it is called the nature”85). According to his commentary, we 
understand that the sentence of “Yi Jing” explained the system of creation by “Tian-Di.” 
Moreover, the word Cheng Hao as quoted in the commentary showed that “Sheng-Ren” 
in the sentence corresponds to the action that gives law and order by the principle of 
“Ren (人).” “Tian-Di” does not have the cognition of the cause of logic, namely the 
“heart,” while “Ren” does not have the power of the direct creation of matter, namely 
the “doing.” So, the logical world that has law and order is constructed by the synthesis 
of both. Therefore, this sentence explains the interaction between “Tian-Di” as the 
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external beings and “Ren” as the internal beings. Furthermore, “Ren (仁)” in the 
sentence is not the above “Ren (仁)” as a sort of cognition. 
 The “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” gives its own comment on “the impressive virtue and great 
enterprise,” saying, “that which has a lot is called ‘the great enterprise;’ that which is 
renewed every day is called ‘the impressive virtue’”86). Zhu Xi commented on Zhang 
Zai’s commentary (張 1983) that “(Master Zhang said) ‘that which has a lot’ is what is 
too huge to have outside; ‘that which is renewed every day’ is what is eternal and 
endless” 87). Obviously, these phrases mean the infinity of space and time. Zhu Xi also 
said that “we do not provide the ‘that which is renewed every day’ until we know the 
‘that which has a lot.’ It is similar to the ‘Yu-Zhou (宇宙);’ they continue only after there 
is matter” 88), and he pointed out that space precedes time, through a comparison 
between these concepts in the sentence, and that “Yu” is infinite space and “Zhou” is 
infinite time. This is the process of the generation of space-time by the condensation 
and diffusion of “Yin-Yang” mentioned above. 
Thus, Zhu Xi explained that “Tian-Di” and “Ren” are formed from “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” 
and in the end are concepts of space-time, to borrow the difficult words used in the 
“Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan.” However, this is merely half the explanation. He left out an 
explanation for the reason why there are these substantial concepts to more following 
words. As his saying that “all of the sentences after the ‘the impressive virtue and the 
great enterprise’ explain the principle of ‘Yi (易’” but ‘Shen-Ren’”89), he clarified the 
“principle” that is omnipresent in “the impressive virtue and the great enterprise” as 
space-time. 
 “That which arises and arises is called ‘Yi (易)’” 90) is stated in the “Yi Jing.” Although 
this sentence is very simple and rather abrupt, Zhu Xi commented that “Yang arises in 
Yin; Yin arises in Yang; this change is incessant”91) but he broke up the context. This 
comment shows obviously that Yin and Yang produce each other, so that there are 
infinite changes. It is the creation of relative interactions. And this is the “Yi” itself that 
is the fundamental principle behind the substantial principles of condensation and 
diffusion as the cause of creation. Then, we see the sentence “that which forms 
representation is called ‘Qian;’ that which shows a law is called ‘Kun’” 92) after them. 
This explains the concept of “Qian-Kun,” whereas Zhu Xi considered that “the word 
‘shows’ means a kind of appearance; ‘the law’ is cognizance due to detail and dense 
creation”93). This interpretation is the uniqueness that separates “Kun” from “Qian” by 
the existence of material substances, so that it elucidates the nature of both the 
condensation and diffusion of one “Qi.” The substance is “Kun,” but there are no 
definitions of “Qian.” Indeed, it is an important point. No one needs to mention “Qian” 
because the sentence shows that the substantiality is related to the root of space; it is 
the arising of “Kun” as the condensation or existence of substances, but “Qian” as the 
diffusion or extinction of substance. It is the creation of space that is there are 
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substances in “Yu-Zhou” as the infinite diffusion. Therefore, this sentence shows the 
result of the change from “Yin” to “Yang” as the separation of substance from 
non-substance. 
 Next, we will see that “that which knows the comings by thorough investigation of 
numbers is called ‘Zhan (占),’ namely ‘the divination;’ that which is conversant with the 
changes is called ‘Shi (事),’ namely ‘the event’” 94). At a glance, this may show the 
character of the “Yi Jing” as a book of fortune telling. Zhu Xi, however, understood it as 
a kind of ontology and thus said, “‘Zhan’ is the divination, so it is the undecided ‘Shi,’ 
which belongs to Yang. ‘Shi’ is what does it, so it is the decided ‘Zhan,’ which belongs to 
Yin” 95); he defined both “Zhan” and “Shi” as a division between the undecided events 
and the decided. And these mean the root of time. In the preceding section, we 
recognized that the creation of time that starts in the diffusion by “Qian” as Yang, and 
it is perfected in the condensation by “Kun” as Yin, while here we discover the deeper 
cause of time. The undecided beings are separated from an event as originally one. It 
will be decided, to be sure, but it is the future in the interim. After that, the event will 
become the decided past as a pair of future. The future will come after all; what knows 
that it comes is the undecided “Zhan.” Then, after it comes, it will change to the past. It 
becomes the decided event; what knows it changes is the decided “Shi.” As opposed to 
the above, this sentence shows the root of the creation of time as the separation of the 
decided events from the undecided, or from Yin to Yang. 
 The above two sentences state the immanence of oppositions of substances or changes. 
Then, the conclusion of chapter V of the “Ji-Ci Shang Zhuan” is that “the 
immeasurableness of the ‘Yin-Yang’ is called ‘Shen (神)’” 96). Here, Zhu Xi quoted Zhang 
Zai’s comment that “it is the immeasurable because it is two” 97), and commented, “that 
is chapter V. It is shown therein that the substance and action of ‘Dao’ are only 
‘Yin-Yang,’ and its fundamental cause is not based on ‘Yin-Yang’” 98). Perhaps, this 
“immeasurableness of ‘Yin-Yang” is the body of “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang.” There is also truth in 
his comment about the “fundamental cause.” But his comment is almost too simple to 
understand. What did he state through this comment? 
 These mysterious words of Zhang Zai are seen in the “Zheng-Meng (正蒙)”. Therein, he 
writes that “one thing has two bodies; ‘Qi’ is one, so that ‘Shen’ 99) “is the immeasurable 
because it is two.” Furthermore, about the words “changing because of two” he 
comments “presuming and doing in the one” 100). Zhu Xi understood that “this ‘two’ is 
‘Yin-Yang;’ the ‘extinction or arising,’ or the ‘advance or retreat’ (‘two’ is the reason why 
‘presumes and does in the one;’ one is the reason why is the two)…if it was not one, 
‘Yin-Yang’ and others as ‘two’ would not emerge; if there is no ‘Yin-Yang’ and others as 
‘two,’ the one would not also emerge” 101). From these words, we suppose that “two” is 
the principle of the plural. On the contrary, “one” is the fundamental principle. Thus, 
he also said, “the number is two. There is only ‘Yi (易)’” 102). He considered the two, that 
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which is not one, or the plurality, to be the principle of “Yi.” But why did he do so? The 
following quotation clearly shows the reason. He said, “if there is ‘Li’ as the principle, 
there is also ‘Qi’ as the physical; if there is ‘Qi,’ there is also the number. This word 
‘number’ means division or limitation” 103). If there is a metaphysical principle, there 
should be physical materials. Then, these materials have the nature as the plurality. In 
short, there is only difference. “Yin-Yang” or others are something different. They are 
the minimum condition of physical beings. Either the separation of the substance as 
the root of space or the separation of decided events as the root of time are a minimum 
pair for the oneness and will become the plural: the most minute and fundamental 
difference. Here, recall the principle as its essence; it is called “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang.” This 
concept means that if there is one Yin, there must be another Yang. It is the primal 
difference, or difference itself. It is also a negative of absolute oneness. Whatever the 
physical being, it must not be one. At least, it makes a pair with the metaphysical being. 
Then, because there is a pair, the difference naturally emerges, and this difference 
promptly creates space and time in accordance with the above process. Space and time 
are negatives of both oneness and eternity: the infinite “Tian-Di.” Besides, the action 
and reaction of “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” are the most minute of law and order: “Ren.” Therefore, 
such a fundamental difference exists in the innermost concept of space-time of Zhu-zi 
Xue. 
 This idea that a fundamental difference is placed as the root of its own theoretical 
basis is not wild even in the modern sciences. Hartshorne aptly stated that “all sciences 
are the study of the ‘difference’” (Hartshorne 1975: 24). Then, it is most clearly seen 
through the application of the differential. The differential, as its name, is related 
difference. It is a method for analyzing the differences in infinitesimal changes such as 
“Yi-Yin Yi-Yang,” so that it is given such a name. Furthermore, when it is applied to the 
sciences, it seeks the changes of phenomena in infinitesimal space and time. Moreover, 
the method to know the actual change from these infinitesimal differences is called the 
integral. It is similar to the process that “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” as the fundamental difference 
creates “Yin-Yang,” and finally “Tian-Di” appears. It is unnecessary to introduce how 
these mathematical methods are effective. Anyway, it is also interesting to note the fact 
that Leibniz, who had a thorough knowledge of “Yi Jing” in the Western world, 
invented these methods. 
 Thus, we have examined the concepts of space and other important concepts in Zhu-zi 
Xue. Consequently, we first recognized “Tian-Wen” as infinite space-time and “Di-Li” as 
finite space, and next clarified “Tian-Di” as the substance of space-time and “Ren” as 
the substance of logic, so that there is a division between “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li.” 
Finally, we demonstrated that “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” as the fundamental difference principle 
creates “Tian-Di” and “Ren” as the minimum physical world. This space and time 
expands to an infinite field. They are no doubt the whole world itself. The world, 
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however, consists of infinitesimal features. Nothing will exist without this space-time 
or logic called “Tian-Di” and “Ren.” In Zhu-zi Xue, therefore, such a concept of 
space-time as a framework of the whole world, that is the minimum whole, precedes all 
beings. This is the gist of the theory of space in Zhu-zi Xue. We believe it is understood 
that Zhu Xi developed a unique and exact theoretical basis for the concept of space. In 
the next chapter, we adopt these Neo-Confucian concepts as the basis of geography and 
attempt to explain the nature of geography. 
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IV. The application of Neo-Confucian concept of space to geography 
 
1. “Di-Li” as the subject of geography 
 This paper aims to establish the theoretical basis of geography. In order to accomplish 
this, we clarified in chapter II that the characteristic concept of space that it encloses 
the phenomena is the radical problem of geography, and examined the concept of space 
in Zhu-zi Xue, which is expected to be the solution to this problem. In this chapter, we 
will attempt to solve the former problem by the application of the concept of 
Neo-Confucian space, and explain the nature of the theoretical basis of geography. 
 Therefore, we formulate a definition of geography as grounds for the above discussion. 
However, to our surprise, the result is much too simple. This is because we consider it 
is enough to define our field and divide it from others by only adopting the 
Neo-Confucian concept of space. 
 We confirmed the concept of “Tian-Di” as infinite space-time and that of “Di-Li” as 
finite space. They are separated by their cognizableness and based on “Tian-Di” as the 
“substance of Yin-Yang Xing-Qi.” Thus, “Tian-Wen” expands boundlessly to outside of 
cognition, whereas “Di-Li” fits into a frame of cognition. Then, “Ren” as the cognitive 
principle gives law and order to them. Consequently, the extent to which “Tian-Di” and 
“Ren” coexist is recognized as “Di-Li”; the extent to which “Ren” is absent because of its 
uncognizable infinite expanse and circulation is recognized as “Tian-Wen.” We then 
defined the former “Di-Li” as the subject of geography. If this concept is adopted as the 
subject, geography maintains its theoretical basis and its independence. Even so, is it 
true that this simple definition can solve a difficulty as obstinate as a chronic illness? 
We provide the example of a solution to theoretical problems in order to dispel such 
doubts and clarify the appropriateness of our definition. Details are given below. 
 
2. Solution to the problems 
 First, we verify whether “Di-Li” can be the true subject of geography or not. 
Traditionally, the basic subject of geography has been considered as the whole of the 
earth, or its surface. Does “Di-Li” conform to the traditional definition? 
 This question is, in fact, too easy. As mentioned in chapter III, to say nothing of Zhu 
Xi’s definition, even Han-Shu’s “Di-Li” already corresponded with Hartshorne’s concept 
of “lebensraum.” Then, Zhu Xi’s “Di-Li” is more strictly systematized than these 
concepts. Although “lebensraum” is brought about by “an experience of regions on the 
earth as the whole” (Hartshorne 1957: 318), it is the “recognized” expanse but not the 
“cognizable finite space” as “Di-Li.” “Di-Li” is the cognizable expanse. Hence, it changes 
its scale flexibly with the expansion and contraction of human cognizance. At present, 
there are still uncognizable zones for human beings, such as the depths of the earth or 
the sea, or the extraterrestrial sphere and so on. However, if we advance into these 
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zones, they would become a part of “Di-Li” as one of the cognizances. Contrariwise, if 
we abandoned some area, “Di-Li” would shrink. This “Di-Li” is not ambiguous like “the 
earth” and not too subjective like the humanistic “place.” It is a reasonable concept that 
consists of the surface of the earth or part of either the underground or water as 
traditional geographical subjects, but contains uncognizable parts of the earth as the 
subjects of astronomy and others. 
 Then, it is still not enough to explain the nature of geography. As seen in chapter II, 
geography has actual subjects, named “landschaft,” “region,” or, more generally, “space 
as a unit,” to complement the above total definition. Can we truly solve the problem by 
adopting the concept of “Di-Li?”  
 “Di-Li,” however, connotes the meanings of these “units” because of the character of 
“Tian-Di” as its substance; “‘Tian-Di’ is the hugest matter of all, and the matter of all is 
the minute ‘Tian-Di’” 104), so that ‘Tian-Di’ is the one whole if it is too small. Moreover, 
“Di-Li” as its cognizable part is finite space. It is the world within “the wall” that 
encloses “Tian-Di” that had so perplexed Zhu Xi. Then, there is no limitation on that 
definition of “Di-Li” based on cognizance; a researcher has his “Di-Li,” all human beings 
have their “Di-Li,” and any other people or groups have their own “Di-Li.” Needless to 
say, these various ideas of “Di-Li” are not equal; they have various scales, features, 
phenomena, and so on. Despite this, they are one concept with the same definition. 
When we make a general definition of geography, “Di-Li” covers the globe because it 
supposes all of cognizance, from individuals to the whole of human beings. But when a 
geographer studies something, “Di-Li” is based on his cognizance. No one needs to 
incorporate another concept such as “units” or “landschaft.” He should use all 
cognizable spaces if he is a geographer. Even if he researches a small area, all of his 
“Di-Li” will fill his mind as a means of comparison or forecasting. Therefore, he also has 
his entire cognizance as the subject of geography. Its definition is more appropriate 
than the various concepts of space as a unit, which are separated by almost arbitrary 
standards. 
 Second, “Di-Li” does not have the Aristotelian character of enclosing the phenomena, 
as mentioned in chapter II. Thus, we abandon the character that many geographical 
spaces adopt as the basis of unity of the complex phenomena: space as a unit. In 
opposition to the preceding discussions, the pseudo-Aristotelian concept of space, like 
“region,” cannot be the subject of geography. For the formation of space as a unit, it is 
necessary to separate other units, regardless of its definition. Space as a unit is 
recognized after other units. If there are no other units, this space as a unit 
corresponds with the whole world. On the other hand, when there are other units (this 
is the condition of the formation of a unit), both unit A and unit B are defined as the 
subject of geography. If either of the units cannot be the subject, they would not satisfy 
the condition of space as a unit; if research is done in one unit, the subject of geography 
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itself will not be limited by its research area. Therefore, if there are only two units, or if 
there are innumerable units, all of them are considered as the subject of geography. 
Then, if all units are defined as the subject, it is the same as “the earth” or the “entire 
surface” being called the subject; they are not actual subjects such as “region” or others. 
If so, it is only a synonym for “the earth,” so that it is impossible and inappropriate to 
define it as the subject of geography. 
 The reason why geographers pursued such concepts in spite of theoretical confusion is 
perhaps the consideration of systematic science. It was understood that neither the 
materials in physics nor the creatures in biology are the complex whole such as “the 
earth” in geography but are the general concepts of some scientists. Therefore, modern 
geography had to adopt pseudo-Aristotelian space as a unit for its own general concepts. 
Otherwise, it could have been disassembled as natural history by the “modern” 
systematic scientists. Besides, a new question arises there. “Di-Li” is, after all, the 
whole. Then, does it succeed the difficulties of “the earth” like concepts do? Is “Di-Li” 
not a united substance like materials or creatures? Even pseudo-Aristotelian space 
encloses the complex phenomena in itself, so that it has been criticized as “holism.” 
How does “Di-Li” avoid these difficulties? 
 However, this is only a groundless fear. As discussed in chapter III, “Di-Li” and its 
pair “Tian-Wen” are the whole, to be sure, but they are never the complex of the 
features. In Zhu-zi Xue, the differences between everything are emphasized by the 
“Yin-Yang” theory as radical nominalism, so that the unity of the whole is 
demonstrated rather than the features. The same is true of “Di-Li.” The substance of 
this cognizable and finite space exists as “Tian-Di,” which is not a complex of various 
features or any phenomena but the unitary whole, regardless of its scale. 
 This view is contrary to Hartshorne’s theory, which supposed a “total complex” 
(Hartshorne 1975: 44) and recognized that there is a unique complex of complicated 
phenomena in the “space/region.” However, it does not confirm Schaefer’s criticism that 
Hartshorne’s concepts are “holistic” (Shaefer 1953: 246). Zhu Xi also considered that 
Schaefer’s view is “holistic.” Although he regarded the group of features, which are the 
general concepts and subjects of “non-exceptional” systematic sciences, as a model, are 
they recognized as features? We should consider again and again that the concepts of 
the systematic sciences such as “material,” “creature,” “social,” “economy,” and “mind” 
are truly unified as the substance rather than Hartshorne’s “space/region”; the 
“material” is resolved into an elementary particle or some energy; the “creature” is also 
disintegrated into the organs or cells or materials in the cell; and, regarding the 
concepts “social,” “economy,” “mind,” and others, they are no longer so-called “general” 
concepts because they do not have any strict definition. After all, this criticism is only 
popular in the scholastic controversy concerning universals. Schaefer applied such logic 
to Hartshorne’s concepts but not others. He denied the similar problems in the whole of 
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“social science” that he approved. Therefore, we pay attention to his ardent confidence 
in the systematic sciences. He, Bunge, and Harvey, who was a kind of successor, or even 
Naito (1994), who discussed “the end of regional geography,” did not doubt the unity of 
systematic, physical, or social sciences. They are “systematic.” It is almost dogmatism. 
The concepts, as their subjects, are as “holistic” as the concept of “region.” If these 
“systematic” sciences are organized by such chaotic words as “physical” and “social,” 
geography also had its independence since ancient times. Anyway, the concept of “Di-Li” 
is defined strictly in this paper. Then, geography does not have to excuse its own 
“holistic” character, and should not embellish itself by incorporating “systematic” 
concepts such as “space as a unit.” 
 Thus, because it seems that the subjects of systematic sciences are not united as a 
concept, the problem of geography belonging to the sciences, whether the physical or 
the social, is nonsensical. The dichotomy between the physical sciences and the social 
sciences was refused by Hartshorne and Hettner (1991: 167), as seen in chapter II. This 
paper agrees with their view, and we again point out its irrationality. “Di-Li” is the 
cognizable finite space, so that there are many features inside of it. However, it is an 
obvious logical leap that other fields monopolize the features, because a part of the 
features is defined as the subject of these fields. For example, the cell that constructs a 
creature contains water, and the water is a mass of compounds composed of hydrogen 
and oxygen. Then, there is an electric force among these atoms. However, this is not to 
say that the field that studies the cell or the creature is physics or chemistry. Likewise, 
geography studies both physical scientific features and social scientific features, to be 
sure, but it belongs to neither. And of course it is neither the union of these sciences nor 
a kind of eclecticism. Geography is geography; it studies “Di-Li” as the total reality 
before dividing into the physical, the social, or, needless to say, their subcategories. 
Suppose there is a metal. What deals with its property is chemistry; what knows its 
mode of movements is physics. Mineralogists investigate what kind of minerals it 
contains or where it is produced; Economists consider its behavior when it is minted as 
coinage; Anthropologists inquire into why it became money, which is an instrument of 
trade; Historians write about the changes to its value and analyze the cause of these 
changes. However, if it is processed and used as a weapon or a farm implement, other 
sciences should study it. Then, leaving aside whether it is gold, silver, copper, iron, or 
another metal, is it the subject of the physical sciences, or the social sciences? Or, 
should we say that it can be the subject of any science according to that science’s point 
of view? If we should say as such, there are no problems, although a feature dealt with 
as the subject of geography is also studied by other systematic sciences. If a geographer 
talks about the turn of a season, mountains, and rivers, or sees in these the prosperity 
of animals and vegetation, or knows how human beings have used them; is nonplussed 
by wars concerning them, or aware of the essence of nature in the refugee’s poem, these 
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features do not have to belong to a specific field one by one; also we do not have to call 
geography an “integral science.” Frankly speaking, the attacks on geographical “holism” 
or on its character as an “integral science” are a kind of sophistry to deny geography 
itself as the “exception” of systematic dogma. If it is not, the sciences that deal with 
metal are refused as “holism.” We do not expect results from an analysis of the total 
reality through “cooperation” among systematic sciences because they have different 
purposes from each other. Even so-called interdisciplinary studies must have one 
purpose; it is not realized until various specialists attempt to accomplish that purpose. 
 Thus, it is understood that geography is an individual field but not the “division of 
labor” of any other systematic field (Schaefer 1953: 227) or the “integral science” that 
consists of every science (Hartshorne 1957: 536-537). Geography has its own subject 
and purpose. This paper regards its subject as the concept “Di-Li.” “Di-Li” and 
“Tian-Wen” are separated from its inner phenomena called “Xing-Xiang.” Zhu Xi’s 
definition seems to show the fact that “Di-Li” as a finite space is not a complex of 
phenomena as the subjects of systematic sciences but an independent concept of 
“whole.” This idea may be typical “exceptionalism,” which denies the systematic 
separation. However, if geography has a firm subject and purpose, we will welcome the 
idea of “exceptionalism” joyfully. Schaefer feared an isolation of geography, but why 
should a science fear loneliness? 
 Finally, we have to make clear the purpose of geography as a science of “Di-Li.” Briefly, 
it is to know what “Di-Li” as the “whole” finite space is, and what order it has. “Di-Li” is 
not only the cognizable finite space but also the appearance of the “Yin-Yang” principle. 
Then, this principle is the order that is given to “Tian-Di” by “Ren,” and based on the 
fundamental principle called “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang”; geography is a field that clarifies this 
“Yin-Yang” order of the “Di-Li.” The concept of “region,” its divisions, a marketing area, 
or others are no doubt one of the purposes of geography if they are recognized as an 
order in the whole space. However, we must not exclude any features of “Di-Li.” “Di-Li” 
is not a complex of various features but the one whole subject. If we exclude anything 
arbitrarily, the concept of “Di-Li” as the whole will be distorted even it has only a 
minute scale. Therefore, we concluded that the definition that geography studies both 
the whole and the order of “Di-Li” is appropriate for expressing its purpose; geography 
aims to know “the cause of ‘You-Ming’” by “looking down to it and finding ‘Di-Li,’” as the 
“Yi Jing” said. Then we do not have to discuss the concrete methodology because 
geography as one of the oldest sciences has been a study of the whole of “Di-Li” and its 
order since ancient times. Geography has pursued the relation between “Tian-Di” as a 
kind of environment and “Ren” as mankind. Geography has described “Di-Li” and 
clarified the order that is expressed therein by various means. Consequently, we 
vindicate all products of geography. “Geography” is the name of a traditional field that 
maintains its own independence and unity as one science no less than the modern 
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“systematic” sciences105). 
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V. Conclusion 
As stated above, the aim of this paper was to define geography. In order to accomplish 
this purpose, we pointed out the radical problem with the theoretical basis of 
geography and introduced the Neo-Confucian concept of space. In closing, we survey 
the results of this paper. 
Today is a confused age for geography. Although its concepts and schools are diverse, 
contradictory views coexist as if there are no difficulties. Especially, we are 
apprehensive about the confusion surrounding the definition of geography itself, that is, 
its theoretical basis, so that it is discussed in this paper. It would be, however, reckless 
to analyze its definition or basis without any preparation for such disorder. Thus, we 
first uncovered where there is something wrong with geography. 
This is clarified in the discussion of chapter II, on the problem of geographical 
methodology. There, we examined the argument between Schaefer and Hartshorne as 
the beginning of the “quantitative revolution.” A difference of methodology is revealed 
in such exchange of criticisms. If there is something consistent in spite of the opposition 
that divides geography into the traditional and the new, we can expect that the radical 
problem also decides the definition of geography. Therefore, we paid attention to this 
argument. 
 We looked at Schaefer’s criticism of “exceptionalism” in order to describe the 
difference between the “new geography” and traditional views and evaluate its 
influence. His statement is clear. He denied “exceptionalism,” which considers 
geography as neither a physical science nor a social science, and reinterpreted it as a 
subfield of social science that deals with a “morphological law.” This “law” is a kind of 
“pattern” that consists of the phenomena as a shape or an outline like boundaries on a 
map. He called this concept space and defined it as the essential subject of geography. 
Then, schools of both his successors, such as quantitative geography, and his opponents, 
such as humanistic geography, succeeded the concept of “morphological” space and the 
view denying the exception of systematic sciences. They hold one theoretical basis in 
common despite the contradiction of each view. 
 On the contrary, Hartshorne’s theory is irreconcilable to them. He did not consider 
geography as a systematic science. Furthermore, he negated the dichotomy between 
the physical sciences and the social sciences. Since the dichotomy is a fallacy, there is 
no need to discuss geography’s belonging to the systematic sciences. Then, he provided 
the concept of “region” as the essential subject of geography; “region” is a concept of 
space that gives a theoretical unity to the phenomena inside it. It was defined as 
“unique” because it has various phenomena at each place. Therefore, a “region” is not 
similar to other “regions” in spite of their having the same definition. Schaefer attacked 
this character of being “unique,” which seems to be merely a contradiction of the 
definition. 
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 However, comparing the views of both, we understand that they have a common 
concept of “space” as the essential subject of geography, although they rejected each 
other’s view on the relation between geography and the systematic sciences. Their two 
concepts of “space” have only one difference, whether it connotes the phenomena or not. 
Schaefer excluded the inner features from Hartshorne’s “region,” and abstracted “space” 
as the outline that encloses it. However, the successors and the opponents did not 
abandon the inner features that construct geographical space, despite his abstraction. 
In consequence, the concept of space hardly changed even after the “quantitative 
revolution.” Thus, the influence of the “revolution” is only the exclusion of physical 
scientific views because of the acceptance of the dichotomy.  
 After this examination, we analyzed the character of this geographical space. The 
result was that we clarified that geographers have adopted the pseudo-Aristotelian 
concept of space until now. It is the outline that encloses the phenomena and that is 
separated from other matter by its shape. However, it is different from pure 
Aristotelian space because it encloses various phenomena, so that it is in fact unstable. 
This unstable character is the cause of the arguments and confusions presented above. 
We understand that it is the radical problem of geography. 
In order to establish the theoretical basis of geography, we should solve such a 
problem. We introduced the concept of space according to Neo-Confucianism, that is, 
the Zhu-zi Xue, in chapter III because we expected that it shows the essential subject of 
geography more appropriately. 
 Zhu Xi gave a multilayered definition of the concept of space. When it appears as 
space in front itself, it is named “Di-Li.” It is finite space, which is separated from 
“Tian-Wen” as infinite space-time and “Xing-Xiang” as the phenomena within it. The 
basis of these separations is rooted in our cognitions. “Di-Li” is cognizable, whereas 
“Tian-Wen” essentially is not. Besides, the principle called Yin-Yang appears in these 
concepts. They are formed as appearances of the metaphysical principle but not 
substantial beings. The substance of them is named “Tian-Di” or “Ren.” “Tian-Di” is 
originally “Yi-Qi,” which is a monistic concept of materials or energy. However, it is 
fractionalized by the “Yin-Yang” principle. Zhu Xi’s “Yin-Yang” theory is the ultimate 
nominalism, so that not all beings can be identified. However, since this nominalism is 
too radical, the substances always acquire the relative. Then, because of this, 
“Yin-Yang” becomes a kind of monism based on “Yi-Qi.” “Tian-Di” is united by this 
demonstration. Furthermore, the reason why this “Tian-Di” is not only “Yi-Qi” as 
oneness but also the complex reality is that “Tian-Di” has the action of condensation 
and diffusion as the essential of “Yin-Yang.” “Tian-Di” as “Yi-Qi” is condensed and 
diffused again and again, so that it creates space, time, and matter. Moreover, there is 
“Ren,” which construct “San-Cai” with “Tian-Di.” “Ren” is the cognition principle that 
gives law and order to the universe. In the cognizable field that is controlled by “Ren,” 
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the action of “Yi-Qi” attains law and order, so that the total reality is created. The 
division between “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” is also dependent on this cognition principle. 
Zhu Xi said if “Ren” was extinct, “Tian-Di” would become the primitive chaos, and 
finally everything would sink into oneness. 
 In Zhu-zi Xue, the root of “Tian-Di” and “Ren” is defined: “Yi-Yin Yi-Yang” as the 
fundamental principle. It is different from “Yin-Yang,” which means the fundamental 
differential principle as the condition for the world being plural and physical. Zhu Xi 
stated that space, time, and logic are created as the frame of the whole physical world 
in the beginning. Therefore, these substances are in all matter regardless of their scale 
or other attributes, so that “Tian-Wen” and “Di-Li” reside in whatever has cognizance. 
 In chapter IV, we attempted to define geography itself by the application of the Zhu-zi 
Xue’s concept of space; we considered what the subject and purpose of geography are. 
Then, we answered the cardinal question “what is geography?” in the simplest way; 
geography is the field that deals with “Di-Li.” We said only that the subject of 
geography is “Di-Li.” It is, as mentioned above, the cognizable finite space. This concept 
connotes the traditional subjects of geography such as “the earth,” “surface of the earth,” 
and “lebensraum” as a whole. Moreover, it is not the “holistic” assemblage of various 
features that is criticized by Schaefer but one logical united concept. Hence, “Di-Li” and 
the whole of Zhu-zi Xue’s space theory will reject the criticisms of geography, especially, 
that “geography is illogical because its subject is not united as one concept.” “Di-Li” is 
neither an arbitrary division of the real world nor a chaotic mass of disorganized 
features. It is the independent space that is separated from the inner phenomena. 
Consequently, geography studies what the entire “Di-Li” is and how it obtains law and 
order. The purpose of geography is the clarification of “Di-Li” as the appearances of 
“Tian-Di” and “Ren.” This is not one of the modern Western sciences developed at the 
current time but a very traditional and ancient field. The fruits of geography have been 
accumulated throughout all ages and countries and used for various human activities. 
Therefore, our definition shows that geography as a huge and universal science is 
essentially and logically consistent, and separated from other fields obviously, despite 
its extensive scope of study.  
 In consequence, we judge that this paper is unique in three respects, as follows. First, 
we gave a comprehensive Neo-Confucian definition of geography. As stated above, we 
defined geography as the study of “Di-Li.” In other words, geography is “a discipline 
that studies the finite expanse, which is given law and order by a cognition principle, as 
part of the space-time created by the actions of condensation and diffusion from the 
fundamental difference as a condition of the formation of the physical world, and aims 
to describe its whole and the appearance of law and order.” According to this definition, 
we approve the fruits of geography that connote all “geographical” knowledge even in 
studies before the modern age, so that we make clear the logical separation from other 
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fields, and make the application of the Eastern philosophy called Zhu-zi Xue. Ours is 
unique in comparison with preceding geographical studies about its theoretical basis, 
which are based on Western thought and apt to exclude any results drawn from the 
non-Western world. Then, it also has no division from the physical, social, or other 
sciences, and no limitation of methodology, whether systematic, integral, or other. 
However, it is sufficient for us to explain the nature of geography in such a simple way 
if we use the logically strong concepts that are introduced through an exact analysis of 
total reality. The greatest contribution of this paper is such originality in terms of the 
theoretical basis. 
Second, we removed the pseudo-Aristotelian concept of space from the definition of 
our field. This concept of space, which is different from Aristotle’s true view, is unstable 
because it is considered that this concept is united by its character to enclose various 
and unspecific phenomena, so that it has been an obstacle to the basic theory. However, 
it is also the case that there is no more suitable concept for geography than the 
pseudo-Aristotelian one among other Western concepts. The concepts of Descartes, 
Newton, or Kant are universal, to be sure, but they cannot be distinguished from the 
phenomena in space, otherwise they have no relation to the phenomena. Hence, we 
cannot recognize them as the subject of geography. Thus, thepseudo-Aristotelian 
concept of space is still adopted now as the basis of geography. 
This paper, contrariwise, introduced Neo-Confucian space. This concept holds its 
unity without enclosing any phenomena. It is a stable concept appropriate for the 
subject of geography because it connotes the phenomena although it is separate from 
them. In addition, it does not incorporate any concept of “space as a unit” because it is 
not accompanied by the enclosures of shapes or patterns, which is one of the conditions 
of the “unit.” Therefore, our definition of geography escapes the concept of 
pseudo-Aristotelian space. As stated above, our definition does not refuse the fruits of 
other geographic studies, to be sure, but concerning the concept of space, our definition 
is incompatible with almost all of them. Consequently, this paper justifies the whole of 
geography from ancient times to the present, whereas it denounces the theories of 
geography totally. 
 Third, we provided new knowledge of the theory of space as Neo-Confucian, namely 
Zhu-zi Xue space. Even if our view was thoroughly denied, this result would be 
accepted as a progression of geographical thought at least because it showed that there 
is a concept of space in Eastern philosophy as systematic as in Western philosophy; its 
multilayered and united definition by Zhu Xi is very original and too strict. We hope 
that this paper expedites a geographical study based on Eastern thought. 
 Thus, we confirmed the subject of geography and explained its nature. The definition 
of geography, as we introduced, is not a theoretical limitation but a union of opposite 
views. Because it is comprehensive and simple, it can make various theories that state 
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their orthodoxness reconciled to each other. It also emphasizes that the fruits of 
premodern geography such as the “Fudoki (風土記)” or the “Yi-Tong-Zhi (一統誌)” 
cannot be distinguished theoretically from modern Western geography. Furthermore, 
attempting to define the subject of geography produces not an assemblage of each 
theory but a definition. Geography should not limit its own domain; it is one, regardless 
of ages and ages. The more elegant its theoretical basis, the clearer this fact becomes.  
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Notes 
1) As described below, Harvey’s concepts of “absolute space” and “relative space” have different 
meaning from the general terms in the Western philosophy. The unique view of Harvey and other 
geographers is that these two concepts of space correspond with the contrast between Euclidean 
space and non-Euclidean space. It is, perhaps, a result of the confusion about the difference in 
concepts of space between Newton’s physics and Einstein’s physics with the change of 
mathematical ideas from Kant to Gauss.  
2) In logic like this, we find the traditional organic view of nature that Hartshorne succeeded as his 
basic theory. 
3) Here, we give a supplementary explanation because this is not easy to understand. Take the 
example of someone’s hair leaves him body Although it is of course a general phenomenon, if we 
consider that his body is matter, he no longer holds his unity, for losing one hair (even though it is 
only a minute change). However, needless to say, he is still himself. Aristotle concluded that this 
unity stems from his sprit. The sprit as his “form” is not effected by a change to the body, so that 
he holds his identity. On the other hand, because the hair has no sprit, it is regarded as matter. 
This hair, or bronze in the case mentioned above, will change to other matter in a moment of 
transformation. There is no spirit, and their “material” is not inherent in themselves, so that the 
shape is the “form” of matter.   
4) Blaut (1961) refused the division between the “static” region and the “dynamic” because the 
former is not “static” but merely “dynamic,” in fact slowly. 
5) The statement that Kant defined geography as a science of space means that geography should 
study the phenomena in Newton’s “absolute space”; he only opposed geography to history. His 
statement did not clarify the subject of geography, and is not related to his concept of space as the 
“form of a priori sense.”  
6) It also corresponds with space as “visible matter,” which is considered as the general character of 
geographical space (the center of figure 2) according to my feeble discussion (Mashita 2015). 
7) 「往古來今謂之宙，四方上下謂之宇」(『淮南子』「斉俗訓」巻十一・九)． 
8) This part is according to Xu-Shen (許慎), who wrote the traditional comments. He commented 
on this text that “Dao is formless and huge (道無形而大也),” “Kuo is expansion, and Tuo is 
spreading (廓張也, 拆開也),” and “Wu-Xing (無形) as the formless is the situation that the 
universe is still not formed. All things come from Dao, so that it is written ‘the formless will give’ 
in the text.”9) 「仰以觀於天文，俯以察於地理，是故知幽明之故」． 
59 
 
10) 「天文，日月星辰．所昭仰也．地理，山川海澤，所生殖也．」(『漢書』郊祀志下巻・
二十五下・二十六頁)． 
11) 「仰以觀於天文，俯以地於察地理者，天有懸象而成文章，故稱文也，地有山川原濕，
各有條理，故稱理也．是故知幽明之故者，故謂事故也，以用易道仰觀俯察，知无形之幽
有形之明，義理事故也．」(『周易注疏』巻十一・十三頁)． 
12) 「天曰文者経緯度數燦然有章也．…地曰理者高下原委脈絡分明也．」(『易経解』上繋・
八頁)． 
13) 「天文則有晝夜上下，地理則有南北高深．」(『周易本義』巻七・四頁)． 
14) 「天文有半邊在上面，須有半邊在下面．」(『朱子語類』巻二・一頁・淵)． 
15) 「動靜如晝夜，陰陽如東西南北，分從四方去．一動一靜，以時言，分陰分陽，以位言．」
(『朱子語類』巻九十四・二頁・謨・可學)．”Tai-Ji-Tu-Shuo (太極圖説)” by Zhou Dun-Yi (周
敦 頤 ) is the metaphysical writing which is much respected as the origin of the 
Neo-Confucianism. 
16) 「象者日月星辰之屬，形者山川動植之屬．」(『周易本義』巻七・一頁)． 
17)「仰觀経緯之天文，俯察一定之地理．」(『易經訓解』巻三)． 
18) 「某自五六歲，便煩惱道，天地四邊之外，是什麼物事．見人說四方無邊，某思量也須
有箇盡處．如這壁相似．壁後也須有什麼物事．其時思量得幾乎成病．到而今，也未知那
壁後（池本作「天外」．夔孫錄作「四邊」）．」(『朱子語類』巻九十四・十～十一頁・義剛．
夔孫錄略)． 
19) “Di-Li” is not defined as time because no one can imagine the limits of time, that is, there is no 
finite time. 
20) 「晝明夜幽上明下幽，觀晝夜之運日月星辰之上下，可見此天文幽明之所以然．南明北
幽高明深幽，觀南北高深，可見此地理幽明之所以然．學履．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・
十三頁・學履)． 
21) 「問，仰以觀於天文，俯以察於地理，是以此易書之理仰觀俯察否．曰，所以仰以觀於
天文，俯以察於地理，是故知幽明之故．幽明便只是陰陽剛柔，凡許多説話，只是説一箇
陰陽．南便是明，北便是幽，日出地上便是明，日入地下便是幽．仰觀俯察，便皆知其故．」
(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十三頁・不明)． 
22) 「仰以觀於天文，俯以察於地理，天文是陽，地理是陰，然各有陰陽．天之晝是陽，夜
是陰，日是陽，月是陰．地如高屬陽，下屬陰．平坦屬陽，險阻屬陰．東南屬陽，西北屬
陰．幽明便是陰陽．㽦．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十三頁・㽦)． 
23) 「變化非因形象而後有也．變化流行非形象，則无以見．故因形象而變化之迹可見也．
日月星辰，象也．山川動植，形也．象陽氣所為．形陰氣所為．然陽中有陰，則，日星陽
也，月辰陰也．陰中有陽，則，山陰而川陽．」(『周易傳義附録』巻十上・五頁)． 
24) We have to pay attention to the fact that there are of course essential differences in the concept 
of space and time between Zhu-Xi and Kant. Both are similar on only one point, that they 
internalize the absolute space and time. Zhu-Xi constructed an objective ontology basically, but 
not epistemology, as Kant did. 
25) 「天地者陰陽形氣之実體」(『周易本義』巻七・一頁) 
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26) 「問…是蒼蒼在上者眞有主宰如是邪」…「曰此三段只一意．這箇也只是理如此．」(『朱
子語類』巻一・四頁・淳)． 
27) 「僩問經傳中天字．曰，要人自看得分曉，也有說蒼蒼者，也有說主宰者，也有單訓理
時．」(『朱子語類』巻一・四頁・僩)． 
28) 「天只是一个大底物．」(『朱子語類』巻一・五頁・僩)． 
29) 「天地統是一箇大陰陽．」(『朱子語類』巻一・七・端蒙) 
30) 「此聖人作易因陰陽之実體爲卦爻之法象．荘周所謂，易以道陰陽，此之謂也．」(『周
易本義』巻七・一頁)． 
31) 「易字義只是陰陽」『朱子語類』巻六十五・三頁・閎祖)． 
32) 「易只消道陰陽二字括盡」『朱子語類』巻六十五・三頁・不明)． 
33) 「易只是箇陰陽」『朱子語類』巻六十五・三頁・㽦)． 
34) 「天地之間，無往而非陰陽，一動一靜，一語一默，皆是陰陽之理．至如搖扇便屬陽，
住扇便屬陰，莫不有陰陽之理」(『朱子語類』巻六十五・二頁・謨)． 
35) Zhu-Xi’s nominalistic view applies even to an absolute substance. See also Ohama (1983: 
382-420). 
36) 「太極形而上之道也，陰陽形而下之器也」(『性理大全』巻一・十五頁)． 
37) Ohama (1983) mentioned the material aspect of “Yin-Yang” in detail. 
38) 「都是陰陽．無物不是陰陽」(『朱子語類』巻六十五・二頁・淳)． 
39) 「陰陽只是一氣，陽之退，便是陰之生．不是陽退了，又別有箇陰生」(『朱子語類』巻
六十五・一頁・淳)． 
40) 「乾坤是性情，天地是皮殼，其實只是一箇道理．學蒙．方子錄云，天地，形而下者．
天地，乾坤之皮殼．乾坤，天地之性情．」(『朱子語類』巻六十八・五頁・學蒙・方子)． 
41) 「乾者健也陽之性也」「陽之性健而其成形之大者為天…名之曰乾而擬之於天也」(『周
易本義』乾卦・巻一・一頁)． 
42)「坤者順也陰之性也」「陰之成形莫大於地…故名坤而象地」(『周易本義』坤卦・巻一・
三頁) 
43) 「陰性凝聚，陽性發散．陰聚之，陽必散之」(『性理大全』巻五・十五頁)． 
44) 「橫渠言，陰聚之陽必散之一段，卻見得陰陽之情．」(『朱子語類』巻九十九・三頁・
㽦)． 
45) 「天地間只有一箇陰陽…所謂陰與陽，無處不是．且如前後，前便是陽，後便是陰．又
如左右，左便是陽，右便是陰．又如上下，上面一截便是陽，下面一截便是陰．」(『朱子
語類』巻七十四・四・文蔚)． 
46) 「天地初間只是陰陽之氣．這一箇氣運行，磨來磨去，磨得急了，便拶許多査滓．裏面
無處出，便結成箇地在中央．氣之清者便為天，為日月為星辰，只在外，常周環運轉．」(『朱
子語類』巻一・四頁・淳)．This “Tian” is distinguished from “Tian” as the “陰陽形氣之実體,” 
which is an astronomical substance. See also Yamada (1978). 
47) 「知猶主也．乾主始物而坤作成物」「大抵陽先陰後，陽施陰受，陽之輕淸未形而陰之重
濁有迹也．」(『周易本義』巻七・一～二)． 
48) 「知者，管也．乾管卻大始，大始即物生之始．乾始物而坤成之也．」(『朱子語類』巻
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七十四・三頁・謨)． 
49) 「陰陽雖是兩箇字，然卻只是一氣之消息，一進一退，一消一長．進處便是陽，退處便
是陰．長處便是陽，消處便是陰．只是這一氣之消長做出古今天地間無限事來．」(『朱子
語類』巻七十四・四頁・文蔚)． 
50) 「陰陽有箇流行底，有箇定位底．一動一靜，互為其根，便是流行底，寒暑往來是也．
分陰分陽，兩儀立焉，便是定位底，天地上下四方是也．」(『朱子語類』巻六十五・一頁・
義剛)． 
51) Op.15)． 
52) 「物物有乾坤之象．雖至微至隱纖毫之物，亦無有無者．」(『朱子語類』巻六十八・一
頁・僩)． 
53) 「天地便是大底萬物，萬物便是小底天地．」(『朱子語類』巻六十八・十六頁・文蔚)． 
54) It perhaps seems difficult to approve this discussion. This is caused by refusing the concept of 
the “whole” in Zhu-zi Xue, which is different from the Western understanding. Kinoshita (1999: 
103) called attention to this conceptual difference and said, “We pay attention therein to what the 
word ‘全体’ means in the current Japanese, a kind of assemblage, so that it has many quantitative 
meanings. The ‘全’ when Zhu-Xi said, “‘全體大用,’ however, contains qualitative depth; further, 
the word ‘全體’ means strong consistency.” In this, “Tian-Di” is regardless its scale because of 
the qualitative consistency by the “Yin-Yang” principle, as Kinoshita called “consistency.” It is 
never the complex whole but the “indeed one united world” (Kinoshita 1999: 72). 
55) 「乾坤之理分見於天地而人兼體之也」(『周易本義』巻七・二頁)． 
56)「三極，天地人之至理．三才各一太極也」(『周易本義』巻七・三頁)． 
57) The “Sage” was often mentioned as the embodiment of the “Ren” principle in Chinese 
philosophy. 
58) 「夫萬物生之者天也，成之者地也，天地能生成之，而不能治也．君者所以治人而成天
地之功也．非后則天地何以得通乎」(『温公易説』泰卦・巻二・一頁)． 
59) 「範圍天地之化而不過．曲成萬物而不遺．通乎晝夜之道而知．故神无方而易无體．」 
60) 「範如鑄金之有模範，圍匡郭也．天地之化无窮，而聖人爲之範圍不使過於中道．」(『周
易本義』巻七・四頁)． 
61) ”Such as the Sage is only the man” (如聖人則只是人)” (『朱子語類』巻七十四・廿二頁・謨)． 
62) 「天地之化，滔滔無窮，如一爐金汁，鎔化不息．聖人則為之鑄瀉成器，使人模範匡郭，
不使過於中道也．曲成萬物而不遺，此又是就事物之分量形質．隨其大小闊狹，長短方圓，
無不各成就此物之理，無有遺闕．範圍天地，是極其大而言，曲成萬物，是極其小而言．」
(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十六頁・學履)． 
63) 「問，天地會壞否．曰，不會壞．只是相將人無道極了，便一齊打合，混沌一番，人物
都盡，又重新起．」(『朱子語類』・巻一・六頁・揚)． 
64) 「方是四方上下．神卻或在此或在彼．故云，無方．易無體者，或自陰而陽，或自陽而
陰，無確定底，故云，無體．…易是變易，陰陽無一日不變，無一時不變．」(『朱子語類』
巻七十四・十七頁・淵)． 
65) 「與天地相似，故不違．知周乎萬物，而道濟天下，故不過．」 
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66) 「此聖人盡性之事也．天地之道知仁而已．知周萬物者天也，道済天下者地也．知且仁
則知而不過矣．」(『周易本義』巻七・四頁)． 
67) 「仁者見之謂之仁．知者見之謂之知．」 
68) 「仁陽知陰，各得是道之一隅．故隨其所見而目爲全體也．」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
69) 「或曰上章以知屬乎天，仁屬乎地，與此不同，何也．曰，彼以清濁言，此以動静言．」
(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
70) 「智是先知得較虛，故屬之天．道濟天下，則普濟萬物，實惠及民，故屬之地．」(『朱
子語類』巻七十四・十五頁・學履)． 
71) 「此言萬物各具是性，但氣稟不同，各以其性之所近者窺之．故仁者只見得他發生流動
處，便以為仁．知者只見得他貞靜處，便以為知．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十九頁・學
蒙) 
72) Following loyally the logic of Zhu-zi Xue, the body of “Ren” as an epistemic action is not only 
human beings, because “Xing (性)” is “Li (理),” and it dwells in “Qi (気)” as universal matter. 
The so-called “Xing” is “Li” (性即理) and “Li” and “Qi” adapt to each other. Despite the 
magnificent meaning, it was named “Ren” based on the “San-Cai” (三才), as traditional terms. 
73) 「範圍天地之化而不過」，自有大底範圍，又自有小底範圍．而今且就身上看，一事有一
箇範圍．(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十四～十五頁・僩)． 
74) 「一陰一陽之謂道」. 
75) 「陰陽迭運者氣也．其理則所謂道．」(『周易本義』巻七・四頁)． 
76) 「今曰一陰一陽，則是所以循環者，乃道也．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十七頁・驤). 
77) 「陰陽非道也，一陰又一陽，循環不已，乃道也．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十七頁・
銖)． 
78) 「一陰一陽，此是天地之理…這一段是說天地生成萬物之意，不是說人性上事．」(『朱
子語類』巻七十四・十八頁・謨，去偽)． 
79) 「継之者善也，成之者性也」 
80) 「道具於陰而行乎陽．継言其發也，善謂化育之功，陽之事也．成言其具也，性謂物之
所受，言物生則有性而各具是道也．陰之事也．」 (『周易本義』巻七・四頁)． 
81) 「流行造化處是善，凝成於我者即是性．繼，是接續綿綿不息之意．成，是凝成有主之
意．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十八頁・大雅) 
82) Op. 67. 
83) 「顯諸仁，藏諸用，鼓萬物而不與．聖人同憂．盛德大業至矣哉．」 
84) 「顯，自内而外也．仁謂造化之功，德之發也．藏，自外而内也．用謂機緘之妙，業之
發也．程子曰天地無心而成化，聖人有心而無爲．」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
85) 「顯諸仁，藏諸用二句，只是一事．顯諸仁，是可見底，便是繼之者善也．藏諸用，是
不可見底，便是成之者性也．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・十九頁・僩)． 
86) 「冨有之謂大業，日新之謂盛德」 
87) 「張子曰，冨有者大無外，日新者久無窮．」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
88) 「先說箇富有，方始說日新，此與說宇宙相似．先是有這物事了，方始相連相續去．」(『朱
子語類』巻七十四・・淵) 
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89)「盛德大業以下，都是說易之理，非指聖人而言．」(『朱子語類』巻七十四・廿二頁・㽦)． 
90) 「生生之謂易．」 
91) 「陰生陽，陽生陰，其變無窮」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
92) 「成象之謂乾，效法之謂坤．」 
93) 「效，呈也，法謂造化之詳密而可見者．」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
94) 「極数知來之謂占，通變之謂事．」 
95) 「占，筮也，事之未定者，屬乎陽也．事，行事也，占之已決者，屬乎陰也．」(『周易
本義』巻七・五頁)． 
96) 「陰陽不測之謂神．」 
97) 「張子曰，両在故不測．」(『周易本義』巻七・五頁)． 
98) 「此第五章，言，道之體用，不外乎陰陽，而其所以然者，未嘗倚於陰陽也．(『周易本
義』巻七・五頁)． 
99) 「一物兩體，氣也一，故神．」(『性理大全』巻五・八頁)． 
100) 「兩故化．」「推行於一．」(『性理大全』巻五・八頁)． 
101) 「兩者，陰陽，消長，進退．(兩者所以推行於一．一所以為兩)…非一則陰陽消長無自
而見．非陰陽消長，則一亦不可得而見矣．」(『朱子語類』巻九十八・六頁・不明)．The quotation 
in parentheses is the comment by a pupil. 
102) 「數只有二，只有易是．」『朱子語類』(巻六十五・七頁・揚)． 
103) 「有是理，便有是氣．有是氣，便有是數．蓋數乃是分界限處．」『朱子語類』(巻六十
五・六頁・義剛)． 
104) Op.53)． 
105) We should add to the distinction between “Di-Li” and “Tian-Wen.” “Tian-Wen” means the 
unity of infinite space-time. Then, the sciences that take it as their subject are astronomy and 
history. Half of “Tian-Wen” is the uncognizable concept of space. It is the unity of the world that 
is hardly recognized, such as extraterrestrial or inter-terrestrial places, so that the sciences that 
deal with it contain astronomy, geology, or a kind of geoscience; the earth is considered one of 
the celestial bodies. In actuality, we do not know most of the earth without its surface. Then, the 
other half of “Tian-Wen” is the uncognizable concept of time. The science of time is represented 
by history, but it seems to be strange that history belongs to the same class as astronomy. This 
“history” involves not only human history but also geographical and cosmic histories. If we study 
the origin of cultures, human beings, creatures, the earth itself, and whatever else, they will be 
dealt with as the theme of astronomy because they are related to various matter and can be traced 
back to the beginning of the universe. Therefore, the science of “Tian-Wen” is defined as the 
integration of both astronomy and history. It is necessary to take such classification into account 
for definition of geography, however we will discuss this in another paper. 
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